

# Verified iptables Firewall Analysis & Verification

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**Abstract** This article summarizes our efforts around the formally verified static analysis of iptables rulesets using Isabelle/HOL. We build our work around a formal semantics of the behavior of iptables firewalls. This semantics is tailored to the specifics of the filter table and supports arbitrary match expressions, even new ones that may be added in the future. Around that, we organize a set of simplification procedures and their correctness proofs: we include procedures that can unfold calls to user-defined chains, simplify match expressions, and construct approximations removing unknown or unwanted match expressions. For analysis purposes, we describe a simplified model of firewalls that only supports a single list of rules with limited capabilities. We provide and verify procedures that can translate from the complex iptables language into this simple model. Based on that, we implement the verified generation of IP space partitions and minimal service matrices. An evaluation of our work on a large set of real-world firewall rulesets shows that our framework provides interesting results in many situations, and can both help and out-compete other static analysis frameworks found in the related work.

**Keywords** Computer networks · Firewalls · Isabelle · Netfilter · iptables · Semantics · Formal verification

## 1 Introduction

Firewalls are a fundamental security mechanism for computer networks. Several firewall solutions, ranging from open source [3, 71, 72] to commercial [4, 38], exist.

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```

Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT)
target    prot source          destination
DOS_PROTECT all 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0
ACCEPT    all 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED
DROP      tcp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:22
DROP      tcp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 multiport dports 21,873,5005,5006,80, ←
                                         548,111,2049,892
DROP      udp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 multiport dports 123,111,2049,892,5353
ACCEPT    all 192.168.0.0/16     0.0.0.0/0
DROP      all 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0

Chain DOS_PROTECT (1 references)
target    prot source          destination
RETURN    icmp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 8 limit: avg 1/sec burst 5
DROP      icmp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 8
RETURN    tcp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 tcp flags:0x17/0x04 limit: avg 1/sec burst 5
DROP      tcp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 tcp flags:0x17/0x04
RETURN    tcp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 tcp flags:0x17/0x02 limit: avg 10000/sec ←
                                         burst 100
DROP      tcp 0.0.0.0/0          0.0.0.0/0 tcp flags:0x17/0x02

```

**Fig. 1** Linux iptables ruleset of a Synology NAS (network attached storage) device

Operating and managing firewalls is challenging as rulesets are usually written manually. While vulnerabilities in firewall software itself are comparatively rare, it has been known for over a decade [75] that many firewalls enforce poorly written rulesets. However, the prevalent methodology for configuring firewalls has not changed. Consequently, studies regularly report insufficient quality of firewall rulesets [26, 37, 47, 53, 67, 74, 78, 79].

Therefore, several tools [47–49, 53, 55, 63, 73, 78] have been developed to ease firewall management and reveal configuration errors. However, when we tried to analyze real-world firewalls with the publicly available static analysis tools, none of them could handle the rulesets. Even after we simplified the firewall rulesets, we found that tools still fail to analyze our rulesets for the following reasons:

- they do not support the vast amount of firewall features,
- their firewall model is too simplistic,
- they require the administrator to learn a complex query language which might be more complex than the firewall language itself,
- the analysis algorithms do not scale to large firewalls, or
- the output of the (unverified) verification tools itself cannot be trusted.

To illustrate the problem, we decided to use *ITVal* [48] because it natively supports iptables [71], is open source, and supports calls to user-defined chains. However, *ITVal*'s firewall model is representative of the model used by the majority of tools; therefore, the problems described here also apply to a large class of other tools. Firewall models used in related work are surveyed in Section 3.1.

As an example, we use the firewall rules in Figure 1, taken from an NAS (network-attached storage) device. The ruleset reads as follows: First, incoming packets are sent to the user-defined `DOS_PROTECT` chain, where some rate limiting is applied. Afterwards, the firewall allows all packets which belong to already established connections. This is generally considered good practice. Then, some services, identified by their ports, are blocked. Finally, the firewall allows all packets from the local network `192.168.0.0/16` and discards all other packets.

We used *ITVal* to partition the IP space into equivalence classes (i.e., ranges with the same access rights) [49]. The expected result is a set of two IP ranges:

the local network 192.168.0.0/16 and the “rest”. However, ITVal erroneously only reports one IP range: the universe. Removing the first two rules (in particular the call in the `DOS_PROTECT` chain) lets ITVal compute the expected result.

We identified two concrete issues which prevent tools from “understanding” real-world firewalls. First, calling and returning from custom chains, due to the possibility of complex nested chain calls. Second, more seriously, most tools do not understand the firewall’s match conditions. In the above example, the rate limiting is not understood. An ad-hoc implementation of rate limiting for the respective tool might not be possible, because the underlying algorithm might not be capable of dealing with this special case. Even so, this would not solve the general problem of unknown match conditions. Firewalls, such as iptables, support numerous match conditions and several new ones are added in every release. As of version 1.6.0 (Linux kernel 4.10, early 2017), iptables supports more than 60 match conditions with over 200 individual options. We expect even more match conditions for nftables [72] in the future since they can be written as simple userspace programs [45]. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to write a tool which understands all possible match conditions. Combined with the fact that in production networks, huge, complex, and legacy firewall rulesets have evolved over time, this poses a particular challenge. Our methodology to tackle this can also be applied to firewalls with simpler semantics, or younger technology with fewer features, e.g., Cisco IOS Access Lists or filtering OpenFlow flow tables (Section 15).

In this article, we first build a fundamental prerequisite to enable tool-supported analysis of *real-world* firewalls: We present several steps of semantics-preserving ruleset simplification, which lead to a ruleset that is “understandable” to subsequent analysis tools: First, we unfold all calls to and returns from user-defined chains. This process is exact and valid for arbitrary match conditions. Afterwards, we process unknown match conditions. For that, we embed a ternary-logic semantics into the firewall’s semantics. Due to ternary logic, all match conditions not understood by subsequent analysis tools can be treated as always yielding an unknown result. In a next step, all unknown conditions can be removed. This introduces an over- and underapproximation ruleset, called upper/lower closure. Guarantees about the original ruleset dropping/allowing a packet can be given by using the respective closure ruleset.

To summarize, we provide the following contributions for simplifying iptables rulesets:

1. A formal semantics of iptables packet filtering (Section 4)
2. Chain unfolding: transforming a ruleset in the complex chain model to a ruleset in the simple list model (Section 5)
3. An embedded semantics with ternary logic, supporting arbitrary match conditions, introducing a lower/upper closure of accepted packets (Section 6)
4. Normalization and translation of complex logical expressions to an iptables-compatible format, discovering a meta-logical firewall algebra (Section 7)

We give a small intermediate evaluation to demonstrate these generic ruleset preprocessing steps (Section 8). Afterwards, we use these preprocessing steps to build a fully-verified iptables analysis and verification tool on top. In detail, our contributions are:

5. A simple firewall model, designed for mathematical beauty and ease of static analysis (Section 9)

6. A method to translate real-world firewall rulesets into this simple model (Section 10), featuring a series of translation steps to transform, rewrite, and normalize primitive match conditions (Section 11)
7. Static and automatic firewall analysis methods, based on the simple model (Section 12), featuring
  - IP address space partitioning
  - Minimal service matrices
8. Our stand-alone, administrator-friendly tool *ffwu* (Section 13)
9. Evaluation on large real-world data set (Section 14)
10. Full formal and machine-verifiable proof of correctness with Isabelle/HOL (Section Availability)

## 2 Background: Formal Verification with Isabelle

We verified all proofs with Isabelle [58], using its standard Higher-Order Logic (HOL). Therefore, the correctness of all obtained results only depends on a small and well-established mathematical kernel and the iptables semantics (Figure 2). The corresponding theory files are publicly available. An interested reader may consult the detailed (100+ pages) proof document. For brevity, we usually omit proofs in this article, but point the reader with a footnote to the corresponding part of the formalization.

*Notation* We use pseudo code close to SML and Isabelle. Function application is written without parentheses, e.g.,  $f a$  denotes function  $f$  applied to parameter  $a$ . We write  $::$  for prepending a single element to a list, e.g.,  $a :: b :: [c, d] = [a, b, c, d]$ , and  $:::$  for appending lists, e.g.,  $[a, b] :: [c, d] = [a, b, c, d]$ . The empty list is written as  $[]$ .  $[f a. a \leftarrow l]$  denotes a list comprehension, i.e., applying  $f$  to every element  $a$  of list  $l$ .  $[f x y. x \leftarrow l_1, y \leftarrow l_2]$  denotes the list comprehension where  $f$  is applied to each combination of elements of the lists  $l_1$  and  $l_2$ . For  $f x y = (x, y)$ , this yields the cartesian product of  $l_1$  and  $l_2$ .

## 3 Related Work

We first survey the common understanding of firewalls in the literature and present specific static firewall analysis tool afterwards.

### 3.1 Firewall Models

Packets are routed through the firewall and the firewall needs to decide whether to allow or deny a packet. Its ruleset determines the firewall’s filtering behavior. The firewall inspects its ruleset for each single packet to determine the action to apply to the packet. The ruleset can be viewed as a list of rules; usually it is processed sequentially and the first matching rule is applied.

The literature agrees on the definition of a single firewall rule. It consists of a predicate (the match expression) and an action. If the match expression applies to a packet, the action is performed. Usually, a packet is scrutinized by several rules.

Zhang et al. [79] specify a common format for packet filtering rules. The action is either “allow” or “deny”, which directly corresponds to the firewall’s filtering decision. The ruleset is processed strictly sequentially. Yuan et al. [78] call this the *simple list model*. ITVal also supports calls to user-defined chains as an action. This allows “jumping” within the ruleset without having a final filtering decision yet. This is called the *complex chain model* [78].

In general, a packet header is a bitstring which can be matched against [80]. Zhang et al. [79] support matching on the following packet header fields: IP source and destination address, protocol, and port on layer 4. This model is commonly found in the literature [8, 11, 12, 63, 78, 79]. ITVal extends these match conditions with flags (e.g., TCP SYN) and connection states (INVALID, NEW, ESTABLISHED, RELATED). The state matching is treated as just another match condition.<sup>1</sup> This model is similar to Margrave’s model for IOS [53]. When comparing these features to the simple firewall in Figure 1, it becomes obvious that none of these tools supports that firewall.

We are not the first to propose simplifying firewall rulesets to enable subsequent analysis. Brucker et al. [10, 12, 13] provide algorithms to transform firewall rulesets to enable the testing of a firewall. They prove correctness of their transformations in Isabelle/HOL. Unfortunately, their supported firewall model is very limited, even more limited than the model used by the tools presented above. They support the simple list model and are restricted to match only on networks and (transport layer) ports and protocols. Instead of natively supporting IP addresses, they support the notion of networks which imposes additional constraints: While it is natural for IP address ranges in a ruleset to overlap (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8 and 10.42.42.0/24), their notion of networks requires that all different networks in a ruleset must be distinct [10, 12]. Their work is only evaluated on three very small real-world rulesets (less than 15 rules each) of the same institute.

We are not aware of any tool which uses a model fundamentally different than those described here. Our model enhances existing work in that we use ternary logic to support arbitrary match conditions. To analyze a large iptables firewall, the authors of Margrave [53] translated it to basic Cisco IOS access lists [4] by hand. With our simplification, we can automatically remove all features not understood by basic Cisco IOS. This enables translation of any iptables firewall to basic Cisco access lists which is guaranteed to drop no more packets than the original iptables firewall. This opens up all tools available only for Cisco IOS access lists, e.g., Margrave [53] and Header Space Analysis [41].<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Firewalls can be stateful or stateless. Most current firewalls are stateful, which means the firewall remembers and tracks information of previously seen packets, e.g., the TCP connection a packet belongs to and the state of that connection (“conntrack” in iptables parlance). ITVal does not track the state of connections. Match conditions on connection states are treated exactly the same as matches on a packet header. In general, by focusing on rulesets and not firewall implementation, matching on conntrack states is exactly like matching on any other (stateless) condition. However, internally, not only the packet header is consulted but also the current connection tables. Note that existing firewall analysis tools also largely ignore state [53]. In our semantics, we also model stateless matching.

<sup>2</sup> Note that the other direction is considered easy [64], because basic Cisco IOS access lists have “no nice features” [33]. Also note that there also are *Advanced Access Lists*.

### 3.2 Static Firewall Analysis Tools

Popular tools for static firewall analysis include FIREMAN [78], Capretta et al. [15], and the Firewall Policy Advisor [6]. They can use the following features to match on packets: IP addresses, ports, and protocol. However, most real-world firewall rulesets we found in our evaluation use many more features. As can be seen in Figure 1, among others, iptables supports matching on source IP address, Layer 4 port, inbound interface, conntrack state, entries and limits in the `recent` list. Hence, these tools would not be applicable (without our generic preprocessing) to most firewalls from our evaluation. The aforementioned tools focus on detecting conflicts between rules and can consequently not offer service matrices (Section 12.2).

The work most similar to our static analysis tool, in particular to our IP address space partitioning, is ITVal [48]: It supports a large set of iptables features and can compute an IP address space partition [49]. Unfortunately, ITVal only supports IPv4, is not formally verified, and its implementation contains several errors. For example, ITVal produces spurious results if the number of significant bits in IP addresses in CIDR notation [31] is not a multiple of 8. It does not consider logical negations which may occur when `RETURN`ing prematurely from user-defined chains, which leads to wrong interpretation of complement sets. It does not support abstracting over unknown match conditions but simply ignores them, which also leads to spurious results. For rulesets with more than 1000 rules, ITVal requires tens of GBs of memory. Finally, ITVal neither proves the soundness nor the minimality of its IP address range partitioning. Nevertheless, ITVal shows the need for and the use of IP address range partitioning and has demonstrated that its implementation works well on rulesets which do not trigger the aforementioned errors. Building on the ideas of ITVal (but with a different algorithm), we overcome all presented issues.

Exodus [54] translates existing device configurations to a simpler model, similar to our translation step. It translates router configurations to a high-level SDN controller program, which is implemented on top of OpenFlow. Exodus supports many Cisco IOS features. The translation problem solved by Exodus is comparable to this article’s problem of translating to a simple firewall model: OpenFlow 1.0 only supports a limited set of features (comparable to our simple firewall) whereas IOS supports a wide range of features (comparable to iptables). A complex language is ultimately translated to a simple language, which is the ‘hard’ direction.

Complementary to our verification tool, and well-suited for debugging, is Margrave [53]. It can be used to query firewalls and to troubleshoot configurations or to show the impact of ruleset edits. Margrave can find scenarios, i. e., it can show concrete packets which violate a security policy. Our framework does not show such information. Margrave’s query language, which a potential user has to learn, is based on first-order logic.

All these tools have one limitation in common: They do not understand all iptables match conditions. Our generic ruleset preprocessing algorithms help to make a ruleset accessible for the respective tool, but our algorithms still lose too much information. This is because iptables conditions are also related to each other. For example, the `iprange` module allows to write down IP address ranges using a notation more expressiv than most tools support. Just removing `iprange`

matches would lose too much information, since tools would understand simple matches on IP address ranges. We need to rewrite `iprange` expressions to a simpler, semantics-preserving notation of IP addresses, commonly understood by tools. This may be non-trivial since one rule with one `iprange` expression may correspond to several rules with only simple matches on IP addresses. As a more involved example, we saw that most firewall analysis tools do not support matching on interfaces. But given that a firewall implements spoofing protection and the routing tables are known, conditions matching on network interfaces can be rewritten to those matching on IP addresses.

#### 4 Semantics of iptables

We formalized the semantics of a subset of iptables. The semantics focuses on access control, which is done in the `INPUT`, `OUTPUT`, and `FORWARD` chain of the `filter` table. Thus packet modification (e.g., NAT) is not considered (and also not allowed in these chains).

Match conditions, e.g., `source 192.168.0.0/24` and `protocol TCP`, are called *primitives*. A primitive matcher  $\gamma$  decides whether a packet matches a primitive. Formally, based on a set  $X$  of primitives and a set of packets  $P$ , a primitive matcher  $\gamma$  is a binary relation over  $X$  and  $P$ . The semantics supports arbitrary packet models and match conditions, hence both remain abstract in our definition.

In one firewall rule, several primitives can be specified. Their logical connective is conjunction, for example `src 192.168.0.0/24 and tcp`. Disjunction is omitted because it is neither needed for the formalization nor supported by iptables; this is consistent with the model by Jeffrey and Samak [39]. Primitives can be combined in an algebra of *match expressions*  $M_X$ :

$$mexpr = x \text{ for } x \in X \mid \neg mexpr \mid mexpr \wedge mexpr \mid \text{True}$$

For a primitive matcher  $\gamma$  and a match expression  $m \in M_X$ , we write `match`  $\gamma$   $m$   $p$  if a packet  $p \in P$  matches  $m$ , essentially lifting  $\gamma$  to a relation over  $M_X$  and  $P$ , with the connectives defined as usual. With completely generic  $P$ ,  $X$ , and  $\gamma$ , the semantics can be considered to have access to an oracle which understands all possible match conditions.

Furthermore, we support the following *actions*, modeled closely after iptables: `Accept`, `Reject`, `Drop`, `Log`, `Empty`, `Call`  $c$  for a chain  $c$ , and `Return`. A *rule* can be defined as a tuple  $(m, a)$  for a match expression  $m$  and an action  $a$ . A list (or sequence) of rules is called a *chain*. For example, the beginning of the `DOS_PROTECT` chain in Figure 1 is `[(icmp ^ icmptype 8 limit: ..., Return), ...]`.

A set of named chains is called a *ruleset*. Let  $\Gamma$  denote the mapping from chain names to chains. For example,  $\Gamma$  `DOS_PROTECT` returns the contents of the `DOS_PROTECT` chain. We assume that  $\Gamma$  is well-formed, that is, if a `Call`  $c$  action occurs in a ruleset, then the chain named  $c$  is defined in  $\Gamma$ . This assumption is justified, because the Linux kernel only accepts well-formed rulesets.

##### 4.1 Inductive Definition

The semantics of a firewall w.r.t. to a given packet  $p$ , a background ruleset  $\Gamma$ , and a primitive matcher  $\gamma$  can be defined as a relation over the currently active chain

$$\begin{array}{c}
\text{SKIP} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [], t \rangle \Rightarrow t} \qquad \text{ACCEPT} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Accept})], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{\surd}} \\
\text{DROP} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Drop})], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{\times}} \qquad \text{REJECT} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Reject})], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{\times}} \\
\text{NOMATCH} \quad \frac{\neg \text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, a)], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{?}} \qquad \text{DECISION} \quad \frac{t \neq \textcircled{?}}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, t \rangle \Rightarrow t} \\
\text{SEQ} \quad \frac{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs_1, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow t \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs_2, t \rangle \Rightarrow t'}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs_1 :: rs_2, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow t'} \\
\text{CALLRESULT} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle \Gamma \ c, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow t}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Call } c)], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow t} \\
\text{CALLRETURN} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p \quad \Gamma \ c = rs_1 :: (m', \text{Return}) :: rs_2 \quad \text{match } \gamma \ m' \ p \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs_1, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{?}}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Call } c)], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{?}} \\
\text{LOG} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Log})], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{?}} \qquad \text{EMPTY} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Empty})], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{?}}
\end{array}$$

(for any primitive matcher  $\gamma$  and any well-formed ruleset  $\Gamma$ )

**Fig. 2** Big-step semantics for iptables

and the state before and the state after processing this chain. The semantics is specified in Figure 2.<sup>3</sup> The judgement  $\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, t \rangle \Rightarrow t'$  states that starting with state  $t$ , after processing the chain  $rs$ , the resulting state is  $t'$ . For a packet  $p$ , our semantics focuses on firewall filtering decisions. Therefore, only the following three states are necessary: The firewall may allow ( $\textcircled{\surd}$ ) or deny ( $\textcircled{\times}$ ) the packet, or it may not have come to a decision yet ( $\textcircled{?}$ ).

We will now discuss the most important rules.

**ACCEPT** If the packet  $p$  matches the match expression  $m$ , then the firewall with no filtering decision ( $\textcircled{?}$ ) processes the singleton chain  $[(m, \text{Accept})]$  by switching to the allow state.

**DROP/REJECT** Both actions deny a packet. The difference lies in whether the firewall generates some informational message, which does not influence filtering.

**NOMATCH** If the firewall has not come to a filtering decision yet it can process any non-matching rule without changing its state.

**DECISION** As soon as the firewall made a filtering decision, all remaining rules can be skipped. Given determinism (Theorem 1), this means that once decided, the firewall does not change its filtering decision of  $\textcircled{\surd}$  or  $\textcircled{\times}$ .

**SEQ** If the firewall has not come to a filtering decision and it processes the chain  $rs_1$ , which results in state  $t$  and starting from  $t$  processes the chain  $rs_2$ , which results in state  $t'$ , then both chains can be processed sequentially, ending in state  $t'$ .

<sup>3</sup> Formalization: inductive `iptables_bigstep`

- CALLRESULT** If a matching **Call** to a chain named “*c*” occurs, the resulting state *t* is the result of processing the chain  $\Gamma c$ .
- CALLRETURN** Likewise, if processing a prefix  $rs_1$  of the called chain does not lead to a filtering decision and directly afterwards, a matching **Return** rule occurs, the called chain is processed without result.
- LOG/EMPTY** Neither rule influences the filtering behavior. An **EMPTY** rule, i.e., a rule without an action, occurs if iptables only updates its internal state, e.g., updating packet counters.

The semantics is carefully designed to not require a call stack. The format of the **CALLRETURN** rule is part of this design: If we tried to introduce a rule that allows to process a **Return** without either processing its matching **Call** or manipulating some call stack, we would necessarily cause problems with the **SEQ** rule. This is because a rule for **Return** would need to remain in the  $\textcircled{?}$  state, and a later rule from the same chain (where we should already have returned from) could then switch to a decision state. An alternative version of this semantics that always assumes an “undecided” initial state and does not feature a **SEQ** rule is given in the appendix (Figure 12).

## 4.2 Model Limitations and Stateful Matchers

Our primitive matcher is completely stateless:  $\gamma :: (X \Rightarrow \text{packet} \Rightarrow \mathbb{B})$ . However, iptables also allows stateful operations, such as marking a packet, and, later on, matching on the marking.

The documentation of iptables distinguishes between *match extensions* and *target extensions*. Ideally, almost all match extensions can be used as if they were stateless. Anything which performs an action should be implemented as target extension, i.e., action. For example, marking a packet with **CONNMARK** is an action. Matching on a **CONNMARK** marking is a match condition. Our semantics does not support the **CONNMARK** action. This is not a problem since usually, new **CONNMARK** markings are not set in the **filter** table. However, it is possible to match on existing markings. Since our primitive matchers and packets are completely generic, this case can be represented within our model: Instead of keeping an internal **CONNMARK** state, an additional “ghost field” must be introduced in the packet model. Since packets are immutable, this field cannot be set by a rule, but the packet must be given to the firewall with the final value of the ghost field already set. Hence, an analysis must be carried out with the correct value in the ghost fields when the packet is given to the **filter** table. We admit that this model is very unwieldy in general. However, for one of the most used stateful modules of iptables, namely connection state tracking with **conntrack** and **state**, this model has been proven to be very convenient.<sup>4</sup> We will elaborate on stateful connection tracking (which can be fully supported by our semantics) in Section 11.2. Later, when embedding into the more practical ternary semantics, all further stateful primitives (such as **CONNMARK**) can be considered “unknown” and are correctly abstracted by these semantics.

What if a match extension maintains an internal state and changes its behavior on every invocation? Ideally, due to usability, iptables match extensions should be

<sup>4</sup> Formalization: file `Semantics.Stateful.thy`

“purely functional”; however, the `recent` and `connbytes` modules exhibit similar behavior. As a consequence, the tautology in Boolean logic “ $a \wedge \neg a = \text{False}$ ” does not hold if  $a$  is a module which updates an internal state and its matching behavior after every invocation. Therefore, one might argue that our iptables model can only be applied to stateless match conditions. If we add some state  $\sigma$  and updated state  $\sigma'$  to the match condition, the formula “ $a_\sigma \wedge \neg a_{\sigma'}$ ” now correctly represents stateful match conditions. Therefore, it is only wrong to perform equality operations on stateful match conditions, but not to model stateful match conditions with a specific, fixed state. In our implementation, we immediately embed everything in ternary logic and treat all stateful primitives as “unknown”; more precisely, we only perform simplification on primitives which are definitely stateless. This prevents this error and yields “ $a \wedge \neg a = \text{Unknown}$ ”, which is a correct model since we do not know about a potential internal state of some arbitrary match condition  $a$ . To additionally convince the reader of the soundness of our approach, it would be possible to adapt the parser to give a unique identifier to every primitive which is not known to be stateless. This identifier represents the internal state of that particular match condition at that particular position in a ruleset. It prevents equality operations between multiple invocations of a stateful match condition. It does not change any of our algorithms since we immediately embed all these primitives in ternary logic and treat them as “unknown”.

For future work, if we want to consider e.g., the `raw` or `mangle` table with its extended set of actions or OpenFlow with its full set of actions, a semantics needs to be designed with a mutable packet model.

### 4.3 Analysis and Use of the Semantics

The subsequent sections of this article are all based on these semantics. Whenever we provide a procedure  $P$  to operate on chains, we proved that the firewall’s filtering behavior is preserved, formally:

$$\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle P \text{ } rs, t \rangle \Rightarrow t' \quad \text{iff} \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, t \rangle \Rightarrow t'$$

All our proofs are machine-verified with Isabelle. Therefore, once the reader is convinced of the semantics as specified in Figure 2, the correctness of all subsequent theorems follows automatically, without any hidden assumptions or limitations.

The rules in Figure 2 are designed such that every rule can be inspected individually. However, considering all of them together, it is not immediately clear whether the result depends on the order of their application to a concrete ruleset and packet. Theorem 1 states that the semantics is deterministic, i.e., only one uniquely defined outcome is possible.<sup>5</sup>

#### Theorem 1 (Determinism)

$$\text{If } \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, s \rangle \Rightarrow t \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, s \rangle \Rightarrow t' \quad \text{then} \quad t = t'$$

Next, we show that the semantics are actually total, i.e., there is always a decision for any packet and ruleset.<sup>6</sup> We assume that the ruleset does not have an

<sup>5</sup> Formalization: theorem `iptables_bigstep_deterministic`

<sup>6</sup> Formalization: theorem `semantics_bigstep_defined`

infinite loop and that all chains which are called exist in the background ruleset. These conditions are checked by the Linux kernel and can thus safely be assumed. In addition, we assume that only the actions defined in Figure 2 occur in the ruleset; our parser rejects everything else.

We start any analysis with  $[(\text{True}, \text{Call } \textit{start-chain}), (\text{True}, \textit{default-policy})]$ , where the default policy is either **Accept** or **Drop**. This means that existing top-level **Return** actions fall back to the default policy. This is consistent with iptables behavior.

**Theorem 2 (Totality)** *If the caller–callee relation is well-founded (i. e., there are no infinite calling loops),  $\Gamma$  is well-formed (i. e., all chain names that are called are defined), there is no **Return** on top-level, and all actions are supported by the semantics, then*

$$\exists t. \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, s \rangle \Rightarrow t$$

To also assert empirically that we only allow analysis of iptables rulesets which are total according to our semantics, we always check the preconditions of Theorem 2 at runtime when our tool loads a ruleset. First, we can statically verify that  $\Gamma$  is well-formed by verifying that all chain names which are referenced in an action are defined and that no unsupported actions occur. Next, our tool verifies that there are no infinite loops by unfolding the ruleset (Section 5) only a finite but sufficiently large number of times and aborts if the ruleset is not in the proper form afterwards. These conditions have only been violated for a negligible fraction of all real-world firewalls we have analyzed. Those used very special iptables actions<sup>7</sup> not supported by our semantics or special hand-crafted firewalls which deliberately violate a property and which are also rejected by the Linux kernel.

## 5 Custom Chain Unfolding

In this section, we present algorithms to convert a ruleset from the complex chain model to the simple list model.

The function **pr** (“process return”) iterates over a chain. If a **Return** rule is encountered, all subsequent rules are amended by adding the **Return** rule’s negated match expression as a conjunct. Intuitively, if a **Return** rule occurs in a chain, all following rules of this chain can only be reached if the **Return** rule does not match.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{add-match } m' \textit{rs} &= [(m \wedge m', a). (m, a) \leftarrow \textit{rs}] \\ \text{pr } [] &= [] \\ \text{pr } ((m, \text{Return}) :: \textit{rs}) &= \text{add-match } (\neg m) (\text{pr } \textit{rs}) \\ \text{pr } ((m, a) :: \textit{rs}) &= (m, a) :: \text{pr } \textit{rs} \end{aligned}$$

The function **pc** (“process call”) iterates over a chain, unfolding one level of **Call** rules. If a **Call** to the chain  $c$  occurs, the chain itself (i. e.,  $\Gamma c$ ) is inserted

<sup>7</sup> For example, setting **CONNMARK** in the **filter** table where it was not necessary, redirecting packets to userspace with **NFQUEUE** where we do not know how the userspace application handles them, or specialized loggings such as **NFLOG** which is technically equivalent to the **LOG** action and could directly be supported.

instead of the `Call`. However, `Returns` in the chain need to be processed and the match expression for the original `Call` needs to be added to the inserted chain.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{pc } [] &= [] \\ \text{pc } ((m, \text{Call } c) :: rs) &= \text{add-match } m \text{ (pr } (\Gamma c)) :: \text{pc } rs \\ \text{pc } ((m, a) :: rs) &= (m, a) :: \text{pc } rs \end{aligned}$$

The procedure `pc` can be applied arbitrarily many times and preserves the semantics.<sup>8</sup>

**Theorem 3 (pc sound and complete)**

$$\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle \text{pc}^n rs, t \rangle \Rightarrow t' \quad \text{iff} \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, t \rangle \Rightarrow t'$$

In each iteration, the algorithm unfolds one level of `Calls`. The algorithm needs to be applied until the result no longer changes. Note that the syntax and semantics allow non-terminating rulesets. However, the only rulesets that are interesting for analysis are the ones actually accepted by the Linux kernel. Since it rejects rulesets with loops,<sup>9</sup> both our algorithm and the resulting ruleset are guaranteed to terminate.

**Corollary 1** *Every ruleset (with only `Accept`, `Drop`, `Reject`, `Log`, `Empty`, `Call`, `Return` actions) accepted by the Linux kernel can be unfolded completely while preserving its filtering behavior.*

Since we have not formally verified the Linux kernel sources, Corollary 1 is not formally proven. It follows from our previous theorems and we have extensively checked it empirically.

In addition to unfolding calls, the following transformations applied to any ruleset preserve the semantics:

- replacing `Reject` actions with `Drop` actions,<sup>10</sup>
- removing `Empty` and `Log` rules,<sup>11</sup>
- simplifying match expressions which contain `True` or  $\neg \text{True}$ ,<sup>12</sup>
- for some given primitive matcher, specific optimizations,<sup>13</sup> e.g., rewriting `src 0.0.0.0/0` to `True`.

Therefore, after unfolding and optimizing, a chain which only contains `Allow` or `Drop` actions is left. In the subsequent sections, we require this as a precondition. As an example, recall the firewall in Figure 1. Its `INPUT` chain after unfolding and optimizing is listed in Figure 3. Observe that the computed match expressions are beyond iptable’s expressiveness. An algorithm to normalize the rules to an iptables-compatible format will be described in Section 7.

<sup>8</sup> Formalization: theorem `unfolding_n_sound_complete`

<sup>9</sup> The relevant check is in `mark_source_chains`, file `source/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c` of the Linux kernel version 4.10.

<sup>10</sup> Formalization: theorem `iptables_bigstep_rw_Reject`

<sup>11</sup> Formalization: theorem `iptables_bigstep_rm_LogEmpty`

<sup>12</sup> Formalization: theorem `unfold_optimize_ruleset_CHAIN`

<sup>13</sup> Formalization: theorem `unfold_optimize_common_matcher_univ_ruleset_CHAIN`

```

[(¬ (icmp ∧ icmptype 8 limit:...) ∧ icmp ∧ icmptype 8, Drop),
 (¬ (icmp ∧ icmptype 8 limit:...) ∧ ¬ (tcp ∧ tcp flags:0x17/0x04 limit:...) ∧
  tcp ∧ tcp flags:0x17/0x04, Drop), ..., (src 192.168.0.0/16, Accept), ...]

```

**Fig. 3** Unfolded Synology firewall

## 6 Unknown Primitives

As we argued earlier, it is infeasible to support all possible primitives of a firewall. Suppose a new firewall module is created which provides the `ssh_blacklisted` and `ssh_innocent` primitives. The former applies if an IP address has had too many invalid SSH login attempts in the past; the latter is the opposite of the former. Since we invented these primitives, no existing tool will support them. However, a new version of iptables could implement them or they may be provided as third-party kernel modules. Therefore, our ruleset transformations must take unknown primitives into account. To achieve this, we lift the primitive matcher  $\gamma$  to ternary logic, adding `Unknown` as matching outcome. We embed this new “approximate” semantics into the semantics described in the previous sections. Thus, it becomes easier to construct matchers tailored to the primitives supported by a particular tool.

### 6.1 Ternary Matching

Logical conjunction and negation on ternary values are as before, with these additional rules for `Unknown` operands (commutative cases omitted):

$$\text{True} \wedge \text{Unknown} = \text{Unknown} \quad \text{False} \wedge \text{Unknown} = \text{False} \quad \neg \text{Unknown} = \text{Unknown}$$

These rules correspond to Kleene’s 3-valued logic [42] and are well-suited for firewall semantics. The first equation states that, if one condition matches, the final result only depends on the other condition. The next equation states that a rule cannot match if one of its conditions does not match. Finally, by negating an unknown value, no additional information can be inferred.

We demonstrate this by example: the two rulesets  $[(\text{ssh\_blacklisted}, \text{Drop})]$  and  $[(\text{True}, \text{Call } c)]$  where  $\Gamma c = [(\text{ssh\_innocent}, \text{Return}), (\text{True}, \text{Drop})]$  have exactly the same filtering behavior. After unfolding, the second ruleset collapses to  $[(\neg \text{ssh\_innocent}, \text{Drop})]$ . Both the `ssh_blacklisted` and the `ssh_innocent` primitives are `Unknown` to our matcher. Thus, since both rulesets have the same filtering behavior, a packet matching `Unknown` in the first ruleset should also match  $\neg \text{Unknown}$  in the second ruleset.

### 6.2 Closures

In the ternary semantics, it may be unknown whether a rule applies to a packet. Therefore, the matching semantics are extended with the notion of “*in-doubt*”-tactics. A tactic is consulted if the result of a match expression is `Unknown`. It decides whether a rule should apply or not.

We introduce the *in-doubt-allow* and *in-doubt-deny* tactics. The first tactic forces a match if the rule’s action is **Accept** and a mismatch if it is **Drop**. The second tactic behaves in the opposite manner. Note that an unfolded ruleset is necessary, since no behavior can be specified for **Call** and **Return** actions.<sup>14</sup>

We denote the exact Boolean semantics with “ $\Rightarrow$ ” and embedded ternary semantics with an arbitrary tactic  $\alpha$  with “ $\Rightarrow_\alpha$ ”. In particular,  $\alpha = \text{allow}$  for *in-doubt-allow* and  $\alpha = \text{deny}$  analogously.

“ $\Rightarrow$ ” and “ $\Rightarrow_\alpha$ ” are related to the tactics as follows: Considering the set of all accepted packets, *in-doubt-allow* is an overapproximation, whereas *in-doubt-deny* is an underapproximation. In other words, if “ $\Rightarrow$ ” accepts a packet, then “ $\Rightarrow_{\text{allow}}$ ” also accepts the packet. Thus, from the opposite perspective, the *in-doubt-allow* tactic can be used to guarantee that a packet is certainly dropped. Likewise, if “ $\Rightarrow$ ” denies a packet, then “ $\Rightarrow_{\text{deny}}$ ” also denies this packet. Thus, the *in-doubt-deny* tactic can be used to guarantee that a packet is certainly accepted.

For example, the unfolded firewall of Figure 1 contains rules which drop a packet if a limit is exceeded. If this rate limiting is not understood by  $\gamma$ , the *in-doubt-allow* tactic will never apply this rule, while with the *in-doubt-deny* tactic, it is applied universally.

We say that the Boolean and the ternary matchers agree if they return the same result or the ternary matcher returns **Unknown**. Interpreting this definition, the ternary matcher may always return **Unknown** and the Boolean matcher serves as an oracle knowing the correct result. Note that we never explicitly specify anything about the Boolean matcher; therefore the model is universally valid, i. e., the proof holds for an arbitrary oracle.

If the exact and ternary matcher agree, then the set of all packets allowed by the *in-doubt-deny* tactic is a subset of the packets allowed by the exact semantics, which in turn is a subset of the packets allowed by the *in-doubt-allow* tactic.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, we call all packets accepted by  $\Rightarrow_{\text{deny}}$  the *lower closure*, i. e., the semantics which accepts at most the packets that the exact semantics accepts. Likewise, we call all packets accepted by  $\Rightarrow_{\text{allow}}$  the *upper closure*, i. e., the semantics which accepts at least the packets that the exact semantics accepts. Every packet which is not in the upper closure is guaranteed to be dropped by the firewall.

#### Theorem 4 (Lower and upper closure of allowed packets)

$$\begin{aligned} & \{p. \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow_{\text{deny}} \textcircled{\checkmark}\} \\ & \quad \subseteq \\ & \{p. \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{\checkmark}\} \\ & \quad \subseteq \\ & \{p. \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow_{\text{allow}} \textcircled{\checkmark}\} \end{aligned}$$

The opposite holds for the set of denied packets.<sup>16</sup>

For the example in Figure 1, we computed the closures (without the **RELATED**, **ESTABLISHED** rule, see Section 6.4) and a ternary matcher which only understands IP addresses and layer 4 protocols. The lower closure is the empty set since rate

<sup>14</sup> The final decision for **Call** (**Return**) rules depends on the called (calling) chain.

<sup>15</sup> Formalization: theorem **FinalAllowClosure**

<sup>16</sup> Formalization: theorem **FinalDenyClosure**

limiting could apply to any packet. The upper closure is the set of packets originating from 192.168.0.0/16.

### 6.3 Removing Unknown Matches

In this section, as a final optimization, we remove all unknown primitives. We call this algorithm `pu` (“process unknowns”). For this step, the specific ternary matcher and the choice of tactic must be known.

In every rule, top-level unknown primitives can be rewritten to `True` or `¬ True`. For example, let  $m_u$  be a primitive which is unknown to  $\gamma$ . Then, for *in-doubt-allow*,  $(m_u, \text{Accept})$  is equal to  $(\text{True}, \text{Accept})$  and  $(m_u, \text{Drop})$  is equal to  $(\neg \text{True}, \text{Drop})$ . Similarly, negated unknown primitives and conjunctions of (negated) unknown primitives can be rewritten.

Hence, the base cases of `pu` are straightforward. However, the case of a negated conjunction of match expressions requires some care. The following equation represents the De Morgan rule, specialized to the *in-doubt-allow* tactic.

$$\text{pu}(\neg(m_1 \wedge m_2), a) = \begin{cases} \text{True} & \text{if } \text{pu}(\neg m_1, a) = \text{True} \\ \text{True} & \text{if } \text{pu}(\neg m_2, a) = \text{True} \\ \text{pu}(\neg m_2, a) & \text{if } \text{pu}(\neg m_1, a) = \neg \text{True} \\ \text{pu}(\neg m_1, a) & \text{if } \text{pu}(\neg m_2, a) = \neg \text{True} \\ \neg(\neg \text{pu}(\neg m_1, a) \wedge \neg \text{pu}(\neg m_2, a)) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The algorithm explicitly tests for ‘ $\cdot = \text{True}$ ’, since in this context, `True` is the syntactic base case of a match expression  $M_X$  and not a Boolean value.

The  $\neg \text{Unknown} = \text{Unknown}$  equation is responsible for the complicated nature of the De Morgan rule. Fortunately, we machine-verified all our algorithms.<sup>17</sup> Anecdotally, we initially wrote a seemingly simple (but incorrect) version of `pu` and everybody agreed that the algorithm looks correct. In the early empirical evaluation, with yet unfinished proofs, we did not observe our bug. Only because of the failed correctness proof did we realize that we introduced an equation that only holds in Boolean logic.

#### Theorem 5 (`pu` sound and complete)

$$\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [\text{pu } r. r \leftarrow rs], t \rangle \Rightarrow_{\text{allow}} t' \quad \text{iff} \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, t \rangle \Rightarrow_{\text{allow}} t'$$

#### Theorem 6 *Algorithm pu removes all unknown primitive match expressions.*

An algorithm for the *in-doubt-deny* tactic (with the same equation for the De Morgan case) can be specified in a similar way. Thus,  $\Rightarrow_\alpha$  can be treated as if it were defined only on Boolean logic with only known match expressions.

As an example, we examine the ruleset of the upper closure of Figure 1 (without the `RELATED, ESTABLISHED` rule, see Section 6.4) for a ternary matcher which only understands IP addresses and layer 4 protocols. The ruleset is simplified to  $[(\text{src } 192.168.0.0/16, \text{Accept}), (\text{True}, \text{Drop})]$ . ITVal can now directly compute the correct results on this ruleset.

<sup>17</sup> Formalization: theorems `transform_remove_unknowns_upper`, `transform_remove_unknowns_lower`

## 6.4 The RELATED, ESTABLISHED Rule

Since firewalls process rules sequentially, the first rule has no dependency on any previous rules. Similarly, rules at the beginning have few dependencies on other rules. Therefore, firewall rules in the beginning can be inspected manually, whereas the complexity of manual inspection increases with every additional preceding rule.

It is good practice to start a firewall with an **ESTABLISHED** (and sometimes **RELATED**) rule [30]. This also happens in Figure 1 after the rate limiting. The **ESTABLISHED** rule usually matches most of the packets [30],<sup>18</sup> which is important for performance; however, when analyzing the filtering behavior of a firewall, it is important to consider how a connection can be brought to this state. Therefore, we remove this rule and only focus on the connection setup.

The **ESTABLISHED** rule essentially allows packet flows in the opposite direction of all subsequent rules [21]. Unless there are special security requirements (which is not the case in any of our analyzed scenarios), the **ESTABLISHED** rule can be excluded when analyzing the connection setup [21, Corollary 1].<sup>19</sup> If the **ESTABLISHED** rule is removed and in the subsequent rules, for example, a primitive **state NEW** occurs, our ternary matcher returns **Unknown**. The closure procedures handle these cases automatically, without the need for any additional knowledge.

Our generic ruleset rewriting algorithms are not aware of connection state. Therefore, for our intermediate evaluation (Section 8), we removed **ESTABLISHED** rules by hand. In Section 11.2, we will describe our improvements which will enable support for conntrack state. There will no longer be any need to manually exclude rules. In short, we will fully support matches on conntrack state such as **ESTABLISHED** or **NEW**. The observation and argument of this section remains: for access control analysis, we focus on **NEW** packets.

## 7 Normalization

Ruleset unfolding may result in non-atomic match expressions like  $\neg(a \wedge b)$ . iptables only supports match expressions in *Negation Normal Form* (NNF).<sup>20</sup> There, a negation may only occur before a primitive, not before compound expressions. For example,  $\neg(\text{src } ip) \wedge \text{tcp}$  is a valid NNF formula, whereas  $\neg((\text{src } ip) \wedge \text{tcp})$  is not. The reason is that iptables rules are usually specified on the command line and each primitive is an argument to the **iptables** command, for example `! --src ip -p tcp`. We normalize match expressions to NNF, using the following observations:

De Morgan’s rule can be applied to match expressions, splitting one rule into two. For example,  $[(\neg(\text{src } ip \wedge \text{tcp}), \text{Allow})]$  and  $[(\neg \text{src } ip, \text{Allow}), (\neg \text{tcp}, \text{Allow})]$  are equivalent. This introduces a “meta-logical” disjunction consisting of a sequence of consecutive rules with a shared action. For example,  $[(m_1, a), (m_2, a)]$  is equivalent to  $[(m_1 \vee m_2, a)]$ .

<sup>18</sup> We revalidated this observation in September 2014 and found that in our firewall, which has seen more than 15 billion packets (> 19 TB data) since the last reboot, more than 95% of all packets matched the first **RELATED, ESTABLISHED** rule.

<sup>19</sup> The same can be concluded for reflexive ACLs in Cisco’s IOS Firewall [4].

<sup>20</sup> Since match expressions do not contain disjunctions, any match expression in NNF is trivially also in *Disjunctive Normal Form* (DNF).

For sequences of rules with the same action, a distributive law akin to common Boolean logic holds. For example, the conjunction of the two rulesets

$$[(m_1, a), (m_2, a)] \quad \text{and} \quad [(m_3, a), (m_4, a)]$$

is equivalent to the ruleset

$$[(m_1 \wedge m_3, a), (m_1 \wedge m_4, a), (m_2 \wedge m_3, a), (m_2 \wedge m_4, a)].$$

This can be illustrated with a situation where  $a = \text{Accept}$  and a packet needs to pass two firewalls in a row.

We can now construct a procedure which converts a rule with a complex match expression to a sequence of rules with match expressions in NNF. It is independent of the particular primitive matcher and the in-doubt tactic used. The algorithm  $n$  (“normalize”) of type  $M_X \Rightarrow M_X \text{ list}$  is defined as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} n \text{ True} & = [\text{True}] \\ n (m_1 \wedge m_2) & = [x \wedge y. \ x \leftarrow n \ m_1, \ y \leftarrow n \ m_2] \\ n (\neg (m_1 \wedge m_2)) & = n (\neg m_1) \ ::: \ n (\neg m_2) \\ n (\neg \neg m) & = n \ m \\ n (\neg \text{True}) & = [] \\ n \ x & = [x] \\ n (\neg x) & = [\neg x] \end{array} \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} n \text{ True} \\ n (m_1 \wedge m_2) \\ n (\neg (m_1 \wedge m_2)) \\ n (\neg \neg m) \\ n (\neg \text{True}) \\ n \ x \\ n (\neg x) \end{array}} \right\} \text{ for } x \in X$$

The second equation corresponds to the distributive law, the third to the De Morgan rule. For example,  $n (\neg (\text{src } ip \wedge \text{tcp})) = [\neg \text{src } ip, \neg \text{tcp}]$ . The fifth rule states that non-matching rules can be removed completely.

The unfolded ruleset of Figure 3, which consists of nine rules, can be normalized to a ruleset of 20 rules (due to distributivity). In the worst case, normalization can cause an exponential blowup. Our evaluation shows that this is not a problem in practice, even for large rulesets. This is because rulesets are usually managed manually, which naturally limits their complexity to a level processible by state-of-the-art hardware.

**Theorem 7**  $n$  always terminates, all match expressions in the returned list are in NNF, and their conjunction is equivalent to the original expression.<sup>21</sup>

We show soundness and completeness w.r.t. arbitrary  $\gamma$ ,  $\alpha$ , and primitives.<sup>22</sup> Hence, it also holds for the Boolean semantics. In general, proofs about the ternary semantics are stronger, because the ternary primitive matcher can simulate the Boolean matcher.<sup>23</sup>

**Theorem 8 (n sound and complete)**

$$\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m', a). \ m' \leftarrow n \ m], t \rangle \Rightarrow_{\alpha} t' \quad \text{iff} \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, a)], t \rangle \Rightarrow_{\alpha} t'$$

<sup>21</sup> Formalization: theorem `normalized_nnf_match_normalize_match`

<sup>22</sup> Formalization: theorem `normalize_match_correct`

<sup>23</sup> Formalization: theorems  `$\beta_{\text{magic}}$ -approximating_bigstep_fun_iff_ipables_bigstep`, `LukassLemma`

After having been normalized by  $n$ , the rules can mostly be fed back to iptables. For some specific primitives, iptables imposes additional restrictions, e.g., that at most one primitive of a type may be present in a single rule. For our intermediate evaluation, we only need to solve this issue for IP address ranges in CIDR notation [31]. We introduced and verified another transformation which computes intersection of IP address ranges, which returns at most one range. This is sufficient to process all rulesets we encountered during our intermediate evaluation. In the following sections, we show how to support more primitives; the intermediate evaluation only focuses on IP addresses; the final evaluation (Section 14) incorporates many more primitives.

## 8 Intermediate Evaluation

In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our ruleset preprocessing described thus far. Usually, network administrators are not inclined towards publishing their firewall ruleset because of potential negative security implications. For this intermediate evaluation, we have obtained approximately 20k real-world rules and the permission to publish them. An even larger evaluation follows in Section 14. In addition to the running example in Figure 1 (a small real-world firewall), we tested our algorithms on four other real-world firewalls. We put focus on the third ruleset, because it is one of the largest and the most interesting one.

For our analysis, we wanted to know how the firewall partitions the IPv4 space. Therefore, we used a matcher  $\gamma$  which only understands source/destination IP addresses and the layer 4 protocols TCP and UDP. Our algorithms do not require special processing capabilities, they can be executed within seconds on a common off-the-shelf laptop with 4 GB of memory.

*Ruleset 1* is taken from a Shorewall [29] firewall, running on a home router, with around 500 rules. We verified that our algorithms correctly unfolds, preprocesses, and simplifies this ruleset. We expected to see, in both the upper and lower closure, that the firewall drops packets from private IP ranges. However, we could not see this in the upper closure and verified that the firewall does indeed not block such packets if their connection is in a certain state. The administrator of the firewall confirmed this issue and, upon further investigation, rewrote the whole firewall.

*Ruleset 2* is taken from a small firewall script found online [2]. Although it only contains about 50 rules, we found that it contains a serious mistake. We assume the author accidentally confused iptables' `-I` (insert at top) and `-A` (append at tail) options. We saw this after unfolding, as the firewall allows nearly all packets at the beginning. Subsequent rules are shadowed and cannot apply. However, these rules come with a documentation of their intended purpose, such as “drop reserved addresses”, which highlights the error. We verified the erroneous behavior by installing the firewall on our systems. Thus, our unfolding algorithm alone can provide valuable insights.

*Ruleset 3 & 4* are taken from the main firewall of our lab (Chair of Network Architectures and Services). One snapshot was taken 2013 with 2800 rules and one snapshot was taken 2014, containing around 4000 rules. It is obvious that

these rulesets have grown historically. About ten years ago, these two rulesets would have been the largest real-world rulesets ever analyzed in academia [75].

We present the analysis results of the 2013 version of the firewall. Details can be found in the additional material. We removed the first three rules. The first rule was the `ESTABLISHED` rule, as discussed in Section 6.4. Our focus was put on the second rule when we calculated the lower closure: this rule was responsible for the lower closure being the empty set. Upon closer inspection of this rule, we realized that it was ‘dead’, i.e., it can never apply. We confirmed this observation by changing the target to a `Log` action on the real firewall and could never see a hit of this rule for months. Due to our analysis, this rule could be removed. The third rule performed SSH rate limiting (a `Drop` rule). We removed this rule because we had a very good understanding of it. Keeping it would not influence correctness of the upper closure, but lead to a smaller lower closure than necessary.

First, we tested the ruleset with the well-maintained Firewall Builder [55]. The original ruleset could not be imported by Firewall Builder due to 22 errors, caused by unknown match expressions. Using the calculated upper closure, Firewall Builder could import this ruleset without any problems.

Next, we tested ITVal’s IP space partitioning query [49]. On our original ruleset with 2800 rules, ITVal completed the query with around 3 GB of RAM in around 1 min. Analyzing ITVal’s debug output, we found that most of the rules were not understood correctly due to unknown primitives. Thus, the results were not reliable. We could verify this as `127.0.0.0/8`, obviously dropped by our firewall, was grouped into the same class as the rest of the Internet. In contrast, using the upper and lower closure ruleset, ITVal correctly identifies `127.0.0.0/8` as its own class.

We found another interesting result about ITVal: The (optimized) upper closure ruleset only contains around 1000 rules and the lower closure only around 500 rules. Thus, we expected that ITVal could process these rulesets significantly faster. However, the opposite is the case: ITVal requires more than 10 times the resources (both CPU and RAM; we had to move the analysis to a big machine with > 40 GB of memory) to finish the analysis of the closures. We assume that this is due to the fact that ITVal now understands *all* rules. Yet, Section 14 will reveal that ITVal still computes wrong results.

*Limitations of the Translation* We inspected the simplified rulesets and observed a few limitations of the translation.

First, iptables only accepts match expressions in NNF. i.e., there are no nested negated expressions. For example, iptables can load `-s 10.0.0.0/8 ! -p tcp` but not `! (-s 10.0.0.0/8 -p tcp)`. However, such negated expressions may occur as a result of the unfolding algorithm. To accommodate for this, we presented the algorithm `n` to translate a ruleset to a ruleset where all match conditions are in NNF (Section 7). However, there is an additional constraint imposed by iptables: a primitive must only occur at most once. A violation of this constraint can be introduced by unfolding, but algorithm `n` does not resolve this violation. Second, our algorithms so far only considered generic primitives but did not reason about details of the primitives themselves. We excluded these problems for the intermediate evaluation as we only modeled simple matches on IP addresses and the Layer 4 protocols `tcp` and `udp` for  $\gamma$ . Primitives may also be related and some can be further simplified. For example, a rule which matches on both `tcp` and

`icmp` can be removed as a packet cannot be both. As we indicated in Section 3.2, primitives may also be related and can be transformed into simpler primitives. These problems will be addressed in the following sections.

## 9 Simple Firewall Model

Now, we present a very simple firewall model. This model was designed to feature nice mathematical properties, but it is too simplistic to mirror the real world. Afterwards, we will compare it to our model for real-world firewalls of Section 4. Section 10 will show how rulesets can be translated between these two models. This preprocessing step converts firewall rulesets from the real-world model to the simple model, which greatly simplifies all future static firewall analysis.

We will write simple firewall rules as tuple  $(m, a)$ , where  $m$  is a match expression and  $a$  is the action the firewall performs if  $m$  matches for a packet. The firewall has two possibilities for the filtering decision: it may accept ( $\odot$ ) the packet or deny ( $\otimes$ ) the packet. We will also use the intermediate state ( $\odot$ ) in which the firewall did not come to a filtering decision yet. Note that iptables firewalls always have a default policy and the  $\odot$  case cannot occur as final decision for the simple firewalls we will construct.

The semantics of the simple model is given by a recursive function. The first parameter is the ruleset the firewall iterates over, the second parameter is the packet.

```

simple-fw [] p =  $\odot$ 
simple-fw ((m, Accept) :: rs) p = if match m p then  $\odot$  else simple-fw rs p
simple-fw ((m, Drop) :: rs) p = if match m p then  $\otimes$  else simple-fw rs p

```

A function `match` tests whether a packet  $p$  matches the match condition  $m$ .<sup>24</sup> The match condition is an 7-tuple, consisting of the following primitives:

(in, out, src, dst, protocol, src ports, dst ports)

In contrast to iptables, negating matches is not supported. In detail, the following primitives are supported:

- in/out interface, including support for the ‘+’ wildcard
- source/destination IP address range in CIDR notation, e.g., 192.168.0.0/24
- protocol (`Any`, `tcp`, `udp`, `icmp`, or any numeric protocol identifier)
- source/destination interval of ports, e.g., 0:65535

For example, we obtain an empty match (a match that does not apply to any packet) if and only if an end port is greater than the start port.<sup>25</sup> The match which matches any packet is constructed by setting the interfaces to ‘+’, the IP to 0.0.0.0/0, the ports to 0:65535 and the protocol to `Any`.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Note that this is not the same function as in Section 4, because this simple `match` function does not require parameter  $\gamma$ . Roughly speaking, it already has the primitive matcher hard-coded in it.

<sup>25</sup> Formalization: theorem `empty_match`

<sup>26</sup> Formalization: theorem `simple_match_any`

We require that all match conditions are well-formed, i.e., it is only allowed to match on ports (other than the universe 0:65535) if the protocol is tcp, udp, or sctp.

With this type of match expression, it is possible to implement a function `conj` which takes two match expressions  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  and returns exactly one match expression being the conjunction of both.<sup>27</sup>

### Theorem 9 (Conjunction of two simple match expressions)

$$\text{match } m_1 \ p \ \wedge \ \text{match } m_2 \ p \ \longleftrightarrow \ \text{match } (\text{conj } m_1 \ m_2) \ p$$

Computing the conjunction of the individual match expressions for port intervals and single protocols is straightforward. The conjunction of two intervals in CIDR notation is either empty or the smaller of both intervals. The conjunction of two interfaces is either empty if they do not share a common prefix, otherwise it is the longest of both interfaces (non-wildcard interfaces dominate wildcard interfaces).

The `conj` of two well-formed matches is again well-formed.<sup>28</sup>

The type of match expressions was carefully designed such that the conjunction of *two* match expressions is only *one* match expression. If features were added to the match expression, for example negated interfaces, this would no longer be guaranteed. Of all common features found in a firewall, we only found that it would further be possible to add TCP flags to the match expression without violating the aforementioned conjunction property.

## 10 Translation to the Simple Firewall Model

The semantics given in Section 4 includes a primitive matcher  $\gamma$  that decides whether a certain primitive matches a packet. The model and all algorithms on top of it are proven correct for an arbitrary  $\gamma$ , hence, this model supports *all* iptables matching features. Obviously, there is no executable code for an arbitrary  $\gamma$ . However, the algorithms to transform rulesets we present are executable. To have a clear semantics of the primitives, we have defined a subset of  $\gamma$ , namely for all primitives supported by the simple firewall and some further primitives, detailed in Section 11. We assume that  $\gamma$  behaves as expected on our subset, but it may show arbitrary behavior for all other primitives. We say we *agree* on  $\gamma$ . For example,  $\gamma$  behaves as expected on IP addresses, but it may show arbitrary behavior for a `bfp` match.

Using our previously described algorithms, we assume that the ruleset is already unfolded and the match expressions are normalized. This leaves a ruleset where only the following actions occur: `Accept` and `Drop`.<sup>29</sup> Thus, a large step for translating the real-world model to the simple firewall model is already accomplished. Translating the match expressions for the simple firewall remains. Of course, it is not possible to translate all primitives to the very limited `simple-fw` model, so we will make use of the `pu` algorithm when necessary. For the sake of the example, we will only consider the overapproximation in the following parts

<sup>27</sup> Formalization: theorem `simple_match_and_correct`

<sup>28</sup> Formalization: theorem `simple_match_and_valid`

<sup>29</sup> Formalization: theorems `rewrite_Goto_chain_safe`, `unfold_optimize_common_matcher_univ_ruleset_CHAIN`

of this article; the underapproximation is analogous and can be found in our formalization.

Since firewalls usually accept all packets which belong to an **ESTABLISHED** connection, the interesting access control rules in a ruleset only apply to **NEW** packets. We only consider **NEW** packets, i.e., `--ctstate NEW` and `--syn` for TCP packets. Our first goal is to translate a ruleset from the real-world model to the simple model. We have proven<sup>30</sup> that the set of new packets accepted by the simple firewall is a superset (overapproximation) of the packets accepted by the real-world model. This is a core contribution and we expand on the translation in the following section.

**Theorem 10 (Translation to simple firewall model)** *For  $\gamma$  we agree on*

$$\begin{aligned} & \{p. \text{ new } p \wedge \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow \textcircled{\vee}\} \\ & \subseteq \\ & \{p. \text{ new } p \wedge \text{simple-fw}(\text{translate-oapprox } rs) = \textcircled{\vee}\} \end{aligned}$$

Any packet dropped by the translated, overapproximated simple firewall ruleset is guaranteed to be dropped by the real-world firewall, for arbitrary  $\gamma$ ,  $\Gamma$ ,  $rs$ . Similar guarantees for definitely accepted packets can be given by considering the translated underapproximation. Given the simplicity of the **simple-fw** model, it is much easier to write algorithms to analyze and verify the translated rulesets.

*Example* Because this article proceeds to focus more on individual primitives, we will increasingly use the more precise syntax of `iptables-save`. We consider a **FORWARD** chain with a default policy of **Drop** and a user-defined chain `foo`.

```
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j foo
-A foo ! -s 10.0.0.0/9 -j DROP
-A foo -p tcp -j ACCEPT
```

This ruleset, although it only consists of three rules and a default policy, is complicated to analyze. Our translation algorithm translates it to the simple firewall model, where the ruleset becomes remarkably simple. We use `*` to denote a wildcard:

```
( *, *, 10.128.0.0/9, *, * , *, * ) Drop
( *, *, 10.0.0.0/8 , *,tcp, *, * ) Accept
( *, *, * , *, * , *, * ) Drop
```

No over- or underapproximation occurred since all primitives could be translated. Note the `10.128.0.0/9` address range, which is the result of the intersection of `10.0.0.0/8` and the negation of `10.0.0.0/9`.

<sup>30</sup> Formalization: `theorems new_packets_to_simple_firewall_overapproximation, new_packets_to_simple_firewall_underapproximation`

## 11 Translating Primitives

In this section, we present algorithms to transform a ruleset without changing the behavior of the firewall.<sup>31</sup> In the result, all primitives will be normalized such that the translation to the `simple-fw` is obvious. We continue by describing the normalization of all common primitives found in iptables rulesets.

### 11.1 IPv4 Addresses

According to Nelson [53], “[m]odeling IP addresses efficiently is challenging.” First, we present a datatype to efficiently perform set operations on intervals of machine words, e.g., 32 bit integers. We will use this type for IPv4 addresses, but we have generalized to machine words of arbitrary length, e.g., IPv6 addresses or Layer 4 ports. For brevity, we will present our formalization at the example of IPv4. We call our datatype a word interval ( $wi$ ), and `WI start end` describes the (inclusive) interval. The Union of two  $wis$  is defined recursively.

$$\text{datatype } wi = \text{WI } word \ word \mid \text{Union } wi \ wi$$

Let `set` denote the interpretation into mathematical sets, then  $wi$  has the following semantics:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{set } (\text{WI } start \ end) &= \{x \mid start \leq x \leq end\} \\ \text{set } (\text{Union } wi_1 \ wi_2) &= \text{set } wi_1 \cup \text{set } wi_2 \end{aligned}$$

An IP address in CIDR notation or IP addresses specified by e.g., `-m iprange` can be translated to a single `WI` value. We have implemented and proven the common set operations: ‘`∪`’, ‘`{}`’, ‘`\`’, ‘`∩`’, ‘`⊆`’, and ‘`=`’. These operations are linear in the number of `Union` constructors. The result is optimized by merging adjacent and overlapping intervals and removing empty intervals. We can also represent ‘`UNIV`’ (the universe of all IP addresses). Since most rulesets use IP addresses in CIDR notation or intervals in general, the  $wi$  datatype has proven to be very efficient. Recall that the intersection of two intervals, constructed from addresses in CIDR notation, is either empty or the smaller of both intervals.<sup>32</sup>

The datatype  $wi$  is an internal representation and for the simple firewall, the result needs to be represented in CIDR notation. For this direction, one `WI` may correspond to several CIDR ranges. We describe an algorithm to `split` off one CIDR range from an arbitrary word interval  $r$ . The output is a CIDR range and  $r'$ , the remainder after splitting off this CIDR range. `split` is implemented as follows: Let  $a$  be the lowest element in  $r$ . If this does not exist, then  $r$  corresponds to the empty set and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, we construct the list of CIDR ranges  $[a/0, a/1, \dots, a/32]$ . The first element in the list which is well-formed (i.e., all bits after the network prefix must be zero) and which is a subset of  $r$  is the wanted element. Note that this element always exists. It is subtracted from  $r$  to obtain  $r'$ . To convert  $r$  completely to a list of CIDR ranges, this is applied recursively

<sup>31</sup> All lemmas and results of the following subsections ultimately yield Theorem 10 and are referenced in its proof.

<sup>32</sup> Formalization: theorem `ipcidr_conjunct_correct`

until it yields no more results. This algorithm is guaranteed to terminate and the resulting list in CIDR notation corresponds to the same set of IP addresses as represented by  $r$ .<sup>33</sup> Formally,  $\bigcup \text{map set (split } r) = \text{set } r$ .

### Example

`split (WI 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.15) = [10.0.0.0/28]`

`split (WI 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.15) = [10.0.0.1/32, 10.0.0.2/31, 10.0.0.4/30, 10.0.0.8/29]`

With the help of these functions, arbitrary IP address ranges can be translated to the format required by the simple firewall. The following is applied to matches on source and destination IP addresses: First, the IP match expression is translated to a word interval. If the match on an IP range is negated, we compute  $\text{UNIV} \setminus wi$ . All matches in one rule can be joined to a single word interval, using the  $\cap$  operation. The resulting word interval is translated to a set of non-negated CIDR ranges. Using the NNF normalization, at most one match on an IP range in CIDR notation remains. We have proven that this process preserves the firewall’s filtering behavior.

We conclude with a simple, artificial worst-case example. The evaluation shows that it does not prevent successful analysis: `-m iprange --src-range 0.0.0.1-255.255.255.254`. Translated to the simple firewall, this one range blows up to 62 ranges in CIDR notation. A similar blowup may occur for negated IP ranges.

Note that, while pretty printing IPv4 addresses in dotecimal notation (i.e., `<dotnum> ::= <snum> "." <snum> "." <snum> "." <snum>` [68]) is simple, pretty printing IPv6 addresses is non-trivial [40] and our implementation contains the first formally machine-verified IPv6 pretty printer [25].

## 11.2 conntrack State

If a packet  $p$  is matched against the stateful match condition `ESTABLISHED`, conntrack looks up  $p$  in its state table. When the firewall comes to a filtering decision for  $p$ , if the packet is not dropped and the state was `NEW`, the conntrack state table is updated such that the flow of  $p$  is now `ESTABLISHED`. Similarly, other conntrack states are handled.

We present an alternative model for this behavior: Before the firewall starts processing the ruleset for  $p$ , the conntrack state table is consulted for the state of the connection of  $p$ . This state is added as a (phantom) tag to  $p$ . Therefore, `ctstate` can be modeled as just another header field of  $p$ . When processing the ruleset, it is not necessary to inspect the conntrack table but only the virtual state tag of the packet. After processing, the state table is updated accordingly.

We have proven that both models are equivalent to each other.<sup>34</sup> The latter model is simpler for analysis purposes since the conntrack state can be considered an ordinary packet field.<sup>35</sup>

In Theorem 10, we are only interested in `NEW` packets. In contrast to our intermediate evaluation (Section 8), there is no longer the need to manually exclude

<sup>33</sup> Formalization: theorem `cidr_split_prefix`

<sup>34</sup> Formalization: file `Semantics.Stateful.thy`

<sup>35</sup> This holds because the semantics does not modify a packet during filtering.

**ESTABLISHED** rules from a ruleset. The alternative model allows us to consider only **NEW** packets: all state matches can be removed (by being pre-evaluated for an arbitrary **NEW** packet) from the ruleset without changing the filtering behavior of the firewall.

### 11.3 Layer 4 Ports

Translating singleton ports or intervals of ports to the simple firewall is straightforward. A challenge remains for negated port ranges and the `multiport` module. However, the word interval type is also applicable to 16 bit machine words and solves these challenges. For ports, there is no need to translate an interval back to CIDR notation.<sup>36</sup>

In the original paper [24], we made a serious mistake [28] when specifying the semantics of matches on ports. Fortunately, the error only manifests itself in corner cases and did not affect the published evaluation. However, we have seen rulesets in the wild which triggered the bug, hence, it is not purely of academic nature. Since we have proven the correctness of all our algorithms and checked all assumptions, the bug did not exist in the code, but in the model. We describe the problem and its resolution (which has already been implemented) in this section.

We defined the datatype of a source port match as follows:

**datatype** *src-ports* = SrcPorts (16 word × 16 word)

This datatype describes a source port match as an interval of 16 bit port numbers. The match semantics for a packet were defined such that the source port of the packet must be in the interval. For example, packet *p* matches SrcPorts *a b* if and only if  $a \leq m.\text{src-port} \leq b$ . We defined DstPorts analogously.

With these semantics, we can construct a corner case which describes why they do not correspond to reality. Consider the following firewall:

```
*filter
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
:CHAIN - [0:0]
-A FORWARD -j CHAIN
-A CHAIN -p tcp -m tcp --sport 22 -j RETURN
-A CHAIN -p udp -m udp --dport 80 -j RETURN
-A CHAIN -j DROP
COMMIT
```

The firewall in `iptables-save` format shows the `filter` table, which consists of the two chains `FORWARD` and `CHAIN`. The `FORWARD` chain is built-in and has a default policy if `Accept` here. Starting at the `FORWARD` chain, any packet which is processed by this firewall is directly sent to the user-defined chain `CHAIN` first. A packet can only `Return` if it is a TCP packet with source port 22 or a UDP packet with destination port 80. All other packets are dropped. Hence, this firewall

<sup>36</sup> As a side note, OpenFlow (technically, the Open vSwitch) defines CIDR-like matching for Layer 4 ports. With the small change of converting ports to CIDR-like notation, our simple firewall can be directly converted to OpenFlow and we have the first (almost) fully verified translation of iptables rulesets to SDN [50].

expresses in a complicated way the following policy: “*Drop everything which is not tcp source port 22 or udp destination port 80*”. This ruleset, though it does not have an obvious use, was artificially constructed to demonstrate our bug. Our tool has “simplified” the ruleset in the following way:

```
( *, *, *, *, *, 0 : 21 , 0 : 79 ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, *, 0 : 21 , 81 : 65535 ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, *, 23 : 65535 , 0 : 79 ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, *, 23 : 65535 , 81 : 65535 ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, *, * , * ) Accept
```

Given our semantics, the simplification is correct. In reality, this simple firewall is wrong for various reasons. First, it is not well-formed, i.e., it tries to match on ports without specifying a protocol. Second, it has mixed up UDP and TCP ports.

The problem lies in our semantics of `SrcPorts` and `DstPorts`. Roughly speaking, there is no such a thing as “ports”, but TCP ports, UDP ports, SCTP ports, any many others.

We have resolved the issue by including the protocol in the match for a port:

```
datatype src-ports = SrcPorts (8 word) (16 word × 16 word)
```

The 8 *word* corresponds to the `protocol` field in IPv4 [62], respectively the `Next Header` field in IPv6 [19], identifying protocols by their assigned numbers [65,66]. It does not allow a wildcard. The semantics defines that the protocol of a packet must be the same as specified in the datatype and that the source port must be in the interval (as in the first definition).

With the corrected semantics, our tool computes the correct and expected result:

```
( *, *, *, *, udp , * , 0 : 79 ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, udp , * , 81 : 65535 ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, tcp , 0 : 21 , * ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, tcp , 23 : 65535 , * ) Drop
( *, *, *, *, * , * , * ) Accept
```

The negation of a match on ports is the interesting corner case to which the presented problems can be reduced to. We will illustrate the issue with a simpler example. Assuming we have one rule which tries to accept every packet which is not `udp` destination port 80.<sup>37</sup> For simplicity, we assume we have one rule as follows: `! (-p udp --dport 80) -j ACCEPT`. Semantically, to unfold this negation, the rule matches either everything which is not `udp` or everything which is `udp`

<sup>37</sup> Note that this cannot be expressed directly in one rule with iptables. In the example, we used the semantics of `Return` to construct a compound negated match expression.

but not destination port 80. It can be expressed with the following two rules: `! -p udp -j ACCEPT` followed by `-p udp ! --dport 80 -j ACCEPT`. We use this strategy in our tool to unfold the negation of matches on ports. Note the type dependencies which occur: Negating one rule that matches on ports yields both a rule which matches on protocols and one rule which matches on ports.

This example also shows that any tool which reduces match conditions to a flat bit vector is either flawed (it loses the protocol which belongs to a match on ports) or cannot support complicated negations. This includes tools which reduce firewall analysis to SAT [39] or BDDs [5,78]. It may probably also affect ITVal [48] which relies on multi-way decision diagrams (MDD). This was also the case for our  $\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle rs, s \rangle \Rightarrow t$  semantics with the flawed  $\gamma$  described here. Our simple firewall model does not allow complicated negations and we have proven that the match conditions are always well-formed, hence, the presented class of errors cannot occur there.

#### 11.4 TCP Flags

iptables can match on a set of Layer 4 flags. To match on flags, a *mask* selects the corresponding flags and *c* declares the flags which must be present. For example, the match `--syn` is a synonym for  $mask = \text{SYN, RST, ACK, FIN}$  and  $c = \text{SYN}$ . For a set *f* of flags in a packet, matching can be formalized as  $f \cap mask = c$ . If *c* is not a subset of *mask*, the expression cannot match; we call this the *empty match*. We proved that two matches  $(mask_1, c_1)$  and  $(mask_2, c_2)$  are equal if and only if **(if  $c_1 \subseteq mask_1 \wedge c_2 \subseteq mask_2$  then  $c_1 = c_2 \wedge mask_1 = mask_2$  else  $(\neg c_1 \subseteq mask_1) \wedge (\neg c_2 \subseteq mask_2)$ )** holds. We also proved that the conjunction of two matches is exactly **(if  $c_1 \subseteq mask_1 \wedge c_2 \subseteq mask_2 \wedge mask_1 \cap mask_2 \cap c_1 = mask_1 \cap mask_2 \cap c_2$  then  $(mask_1 \cup mask_2, c_1 \cup c_2)$  else empty)**. If we assume `--syn` for a packet, we can remove all matches which are equal to `--syn` and add the `--syn` match as conjunction to all other matches on flags and remove rules with empty matches. Some matches on flags may remain, e.g., `URG`, which need to be abstracted over later.

#### 11.5 Interfaces

The simple firewall model does not support negated interfaces, e.g., `! -i eth+`. Therefore, they must be removed. We first motivate the need for abstracting over negated interfaces.

For whitelisting scenarios one might argue that the use of negated interfaces constitutes bad practice. This is because new (virtual) interfaces might be added to the system at runtime and a match on negated interfaces might now also include these new interfaces. Therefore, negated interfaces correspond to blacklisting, which is not recommended for most firewalls. However, the main reason why negated interfaces are not supported by our model is of technical nature: Let *set* denote the set of interfaces that match an interface expression. For example, *set eth0* = {eth0} and *set eth+* is the set of all interfaces that start with the prefix *eth*. If the match on *eth+* is negated, then it matches all strings in the complement set:  $\text{UNIV} \setminus (\text{set eth+})$ . The simple firewall model requires that a conjunction of two

primitives is again at most one primitive. This can obviously not be achieved with such sets. In addition, working with negated interfaces can cause great confusion. Note that the interface match condition ‘+’ matches any interfaces. Also note that ‘+’  $\in \text{UNIV} \setminus (\text{set eth+})$ . Here, ‘+’ is not a wildcard character but the name of an interface. The confusion introduced by negated interfaces becomes more apparent when one realizes that ‘+’ can occur as both wildcard character and normal character. Therefore, it is not possible to construct an interface match condition which matches exactly on the interface ‘+’, because a ‘+’ at the end of an interface match condition is interpreted as wildcard.<sup>38</sup> While technically, the Linux kernel would allow to match on ‘+’ as a normal character [46], the `iptables` command does not permit to construct such a match [56].

## 11.6 Interaction of Interfaces with IP Ranges

Later, in Section 12.1, we will compute an IP address space partition. For better understanding, that partition should not be “polluted” with interface information. Therefore, for the partition, we will assume that no matches on interfaces occur in the ruleset. In this section, we describe a method to remove both negated and non-negated interfaces while preserving their relation to IP address ranges.

Input interfaces are usually assigned an IP range of valid source IPs which are expected to arrive on that interface. Let *ipassmt* be a mapping from interfaces to an IP address range. This information can be obtained by `ip route` and `ip addr`. We will write *ipassmt*[*i*] for the corresponding IP range of interface *i*. For the following examples, we assume

$$ipassmt = [\text{eth0} \mapsto \{10.8.0.0/16\}]$$

The goal is to rewrite input interfaces with the corresponding source IP range. For example, we would like to replace all occurrences of `-i eth0` with `-s 10.8.0.0/16`. This idea can only be sound if there are no spoofed packets; we only expect packets with a source IP of `10.8.0.0/16` to arrive at `eth0`. Once we have assured that the firewall blocks spoofed packets, we can assume in a second step that there are no spoofed accepted packets left. By default, the Linux kernel offers reverse path filtering, which blocks spoofed packet automatically. In this case we can assume that no spoofed packets occur. In some complex scenarios, reverse path filtering needs to be disabled and spoofed packets should be blocked manually with the help of the firewall ruleset. In previous work [27], we presented an algorithm to verify that a ruleset correctly blocks spoofed packets. This algorithm is integrated in our framework, proven sound, works on the same *ipassmt*, and does not need the simple firewall model (i.e., supports negated interfaces). If some interface *i* should accept arbitrary IP addresses (essentially not providing spoofing protection), it is possible to set *ipassmt*[*i*] = UNIV. Therefore, we can verify spoofing protection according to *ipassmt* at runtime and afterwards continue with the assumption that no spoofed packets occur.

Under the assumption that no spoofed packets occur, we will now present two algorithms to relate an input interface *i* to *ipassmt*[*i*]. Both approaches are valid

<sup>38</sup> A note to system administrators: We strongly discourage the use of “`ip link set eth0 name +`” in production. Scripts dealing with untrusted user input might exhibit a security flaw in such a case.

for negated and non-negated interfaces. The first approach provides better results but requires stronger assumptions (which can be checked at runtime), whereas the second approach can be applied without further assumptions.

*First Approach* In general, it is considered bad practice [75, 76] to have zone-spanning interfaces. Two interfaces are zone-spanning if they share a common, overlapping IP address range. Mathematically, absence of zone-spanning interfaces means that for any two interfaces in *ipassmt*, their assigned IP range must be disjoint. Our tool emits a warning if *ipassmt* contains zone-spanning interfaces. If no zone-spanning interfaces are detected, then all input interfaces can be replaced by their assigned source IP address range. This preserves exactly the behavior of the firewall. In this case, there is an injective mapping between input interfaces and source IPs. Interestingly, our proof does not need the assumption that *ipassmt* maps to the complete IP universe.

*Second Approach* Unfortunately, though considered bad practice, we found zone-spanning interfaces in many real-world configurations and hence cannot apply the previous algorithm. First, we proved that correctness of the described rewriting algorithm implies absence of zone-spanning interfaces.<sup>39</sup> This leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to perform rewriting without this assumption. Therefore, we present an algorithm which adds the IP range information to the ruleset (without removing the interface match), thus constraining the match on input interfaces to their IP range. The algorithm computes the following: Whenever there is a match on an input interface *i*, the algorithm looks up the corresponding IP range of that interface and adds `-s ipassmt[i]` to the rule. To prove correctness of this algorithm, no assumption about zone-spanning interfaces is needed, *ipassmt* may only be defined for a subset of the interfaces, and the range of *ipassmt* may not cover the complete IP universe. Consequently, there is no need for a user to specify *ipassmt*, but having it may yield more accurate results.

*Output Port Rewriting* Our presented approaches for input interface rewriting can be generalized to also support output interface (`-o`) rewriting. The core idea is to replace a match on an output interface by the corresponding IP address range which is determined by the system’s routing table. To do this, we parse the routing table, map it to a relation (which provides a structure which is independent of its order), and compute the inverse of the relation. This ultimately provides a mapping for each interface and its corresponding IP address range.

This computed mapping is very similar to the *ipassmt*. In fact, we found it to be a helpful debugging tool to compare the inverse routing relation to an *ipassmt*. For convenience, we also provide a function to compute an *ipassmt* from a routing table.

Essentially, computing the inverse routing relation semantically is the same behavior as found in strict reverse path filtering [7]. We have formally proven<sup>40</sup> this observation.

Because a routing table may change frequently, even triggered by external malicious routing advertisements, by default, we refrain from output port rewriting

<sup>39</sup> Formalization: theorem `iface_replace_needs_ipassmt_disjoint`

<sup>40</sup> Formalization: theorem `rpf_strict_correct`

in this work. It is not applied for Table 1; however, we additionally show how the results for Firewall D in Section 14 will improve with its help.

### 11.7 Abstracting over Primitives

Some primitives cannot be translated to the simple model. Section 6.3 already provides the function `pu` which removes all unknown match conditions. This leads to an approximation and is the main reason for the ‘ $\subseteq$ ’ relation in Theorem 10. We found that we can also rewrite any known primitive at any time to an unknown primitive. This can be used to apply additional knowledge during preprocessing. For example, since we understand flags, we know that the following condition is false, hence rules using it can be removed: `--syn  $\wedge$  --tcp-flags RST,ACK RST`. After this optimization, all remaining flags can be treated as unknowns and abstracted over afterwards. This allows to easily add additional knowledge and optimization strategies for further primitive match conditions without the need to adapt any algorithm which works on the simple firewall model. We proved soundness of this approach: The ‘ $\subseteq$ ’ relation in Theorem 10 is preserved.

## 12 Analyzing Simple Firewall Rulesets

In this section, we will show two algorithms that work on rulesets translated to the `simple-fw` model.

### 12.1 IP Address Space Partitioning

We present an algorithm to partition the full space of IP addresses that runs roughly in linear time in the number of rules for real-world rulesets. All IP addresses in the same partition must show the same behavior w.r.t the firewall ruleset. We do not require that the partition is minimal. Therefore, the following would be a valid solution:  $\{\{0\}, \{1\}, \dots, \{255.255.255.255\}\}$ . However, we will need the partition as starting point for a further algorithm and a partition of size  $2^{32}$  (in case of IPv4) is too large for this purpose. In the case of IPv6, one address per partition would be infeasible.

First, we motivate the idea of the partitioning algorithm with the following observation. For an arbitrary packet  $p$ , we write  $p(\mathbf{src} \mapsto s)$  to fix the source IP address to  $s$ .

**Lemma 1** *Let  $X$  be the set of all source IP matches specified in  $rs$ , i. e.,  $X$  is a set of CIDR ranges. Given that we have a set  $B$  such that  $\forall A \in X. B \subseteq A \vee B \cap A = \{\}$  holds. Then, for  $s_1 \in B$  and  $s_2 \in B$ ,*

$$\text{simple-fw } rs \ p(\mathbf{src} \mapsto s_1) = \text{simple-fw } rs \ p(\mathbf{src} \mapsto s_2)$$

Reading the lemma backwards, it states that all packets with arbitrary source IPs picked from  $B$  are treated equally by the firewall. Therefore,  $B$  is a member of an IP address range partition. The condition imposed on  $B$  is that for all source CIDR ranges which are matched on in the ruleset (called  $A$  in the lemma),

$B$  is either a subset of the range or disjoint to it. The lemma shows that this condition is sufficient for  $B$ , therefore we will construct an algorithm to compute  $B$ . For an arbitrary set  $X$ , this condition is purely set-theoretic and we can solve it independently from the firewall theory. For simplicity, we use finite sets and lists interchangeably.

The algorithm `partitions` is structured as follows. The `part` function computes a single step and takes two parameters. The first parameter is a set  $S \in X$ , the second parameter  $TS$  is a set of sets and corresponds to the remaining set which will be partitioned. In the first call, we set  $TS$  to  $\{\text{UNIV}\}$ . Then, we repeatedly call `part` on all elements in  $X$  and thread through the results, i.e.,

$$\text{partitions} = \text{foldr part } X \ \{\text{UNIV}\}$$

The step function `part` itself is implemented as follows: For a fixed  $S$ , `part`  $S$   $TS$  recurses over  $TS$  and splits the set such that the precondition of Lemma 1 holds.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{part } S \ (\{T\} \cup TS) &= (S \cap T) \cup (T \setminus S) \cup (\text{part } (S \setminus T) \ TS) \\ \text{part } S \ \{\} &= \{\} \end{aligned}$$

The result size of calling `part` once can be up to two times the size of  $TS$ . This implies that the size of the partition of a complete firewall ruleset is in the order of  $O(2^{|\text{rules}|})$ . However, the empirical evaluation shows that the resulting size for real-world rulesets is much better. While IP address ranges may overlap in a ruleset, they usually do not overlap in the worst possible way for all pairs of rules. Consequently, at least one of the sets  $S \cap T$  or  $T \setminus S$  is usually empty. For example, for our largest firewall, the number of computed partitions is 10 times smaller than the number of rules. Table 1 confirms that the number of partitions is usually less than the number of rules.

Our algorithm fulfills the assumption of Lemma 1 for arbitrary  $X$ . Because IP addresses occur as source and destination in a ruleset, we use our partitioning algorithm where  $X$  is the set of all IPs found in the ruleset. The result is a partition where for any two IPs in the same partition, setting the source or destination of an arbitrary packet to one of the two IPs, the firewall behaves equally. This results in a stronger version of Lemma 1, which holds without any assumption and also holds for both source and destination IPs simultaneously.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the partition covers the complete IPv4 (or IPv6) address space.<sup>42</sup>

## 12.2 Service Matrices

The computed IP address space partition may not be minimal. This means that two different partitions may exhibit exactly the same behavior. Therefore, for manual firewall verification, these partitions may be misleading. Marmorstein elaborates on this problem [49]. ITVal’s solution is to minimize the partition. We suggest to minimize the partition, but w.r.t. a fixed service. The evaluation shows that the result is smaller and thus clearer.

<sup>41</sup> Formalization: theorem `getParts_samefw`

<sup>42</sup> Formalization: theorem `getParts_complete`

A fixed service corresponds to a fixed packet with arbitrary IPs. For example, we can define SSH as TCP, destination port 22, and arbitrary but fixed source port  $\geq 1024$ . A service matrix describes the allowed accesses for a specific service over the complete IPv4 (or IPv6) address space. It can be visualized as a graph; for example, the ruleset of Figure 4 is visualized in Figure 5. An example of a service matrix for a firewall with several thousands of rules is shown in Figure 6. For clarity, this figure uses symbolic names (e.g., *servers*) instead of IP addresses. The raw IP addresses can be found in Figure 7. More complicated examples with highly fragmented IP ranges are shown in Figures 8 and 9; those stem from the same firewall installation, but at a later time. All matrices are minimal, i.e., they cannot be compressed any further.

First, we describe when a firewall exhibits the same behavior for arbitrary source IPs  $s_1, s_2$  and a fixed packet  $p$ :

$$\forall d. \text{simple-fw } rs \ p(\text{src} \mapsto s_1, \text{dst} \mapsto d) = \text{simple-fw } rs \ p(\text{src} \mapsto s_2, \text{dst} \mapsto d)$$

We say the firewall shows same behavior for a fixed service if, in addition, the analogue condition holds for destination IPs.

We present a function `groupWls`, which computes the minimal partition for a fixed service. The idea is to start with the output of the algorithm `partitions` and minimize it. For this, the full, square access control matrix for inbound and outbound connections of each partition member is generated. An entry  $m_{i,j}$  in this matrix denotes whether partition member  $i$  is allowed to communicate with partition member  $j$ . In detail, an entry  $m_{i,j}$  is a pair of Boolean values, where the first element denotes whether all IP addresses in  $i$  are allowed to communicate with all IP addresses in  $j$  and the second entry denotes whether all IP addresses in  $j$  are allowed to communicate with all IP addresses in  $i$ . To compute all the entries  $m_{i,j}$ , the algorithm performs two calls (one for source IP and one for destination IP) to `simple-fw` for each pair of partition members. This can be done by taking arbitrary representatives from each member of the partition as source and destination address and executing `simple-fw` for the fixed packet with those fixed IPs. The matrix is minimized by merging partitions with equal behaviour, i.e., merging equal rows in the matrix. This algorithm is quadratic in the number of partitions. An early evaluation [24] shows that it scales surprisingly well, even for large rulesets, since the number of partitions is usually small.

The algorithm is sound,<sup>43</sup> complete,<sup>44</sup> and generates minimal results.<sup>45</sup> Consequently, `groupWls` computes an equivalence relation over IP addresses with respect to a simple firewall ruleset for a fixed service. Hence, we call the members of the output set of `groupWls` equivalence classes. Any IP address is a representative for its equivalence class.

**Theorem 11 (groupWls sound and generates minimal results)** *For any two IPs in any equivalence class of groupWls, the firewall shows the same behavior for a fixed service.*

*For any two arbitrary equivalence classes  $A$  and  $B$  in groupWls, if we can find two IPs in  $A$  and  $B$  respectively where the firewall shows the same behavior for a fixed service, then  $A = B$ .*

<sup>43</sup> Formalization: theorem `build_ip_partition_same_fw`

<sup>44</sup> Formalization: theorem `build_ip_partition_complete`

<sup>45</sup> Formalization: theorem `build_ip_partition_same_fw_min`

*Improving Performance* We assume that the ruleset has a default policy. Otherwise, we fall back to our previous, slower algorithm. Any simplified, well-formed iptables ruleset has a default policy though.<sup>46</sup> The above algorithm performs calls to `simple-fw` for each pair of representatives in the partition. The algorithm is significantly slowed down by the quadratic number of calls to `simple-fw`. Instead of repeatedly executing `simple-fw` for all combinations of representatives as source and destination address, for a fixed service and fixed source address, we can pre-compute the set of all matching destination addresses with one iteration over the ruleset. The same holds for the matching source addresses. As a rough estimate, this brings down the quadratic number of calls to `simple-fw` to a linear number of iterations over the ruleset. Note that the asymptotic runtime is still quadratic. We have implemented this improved algorithm and proven that Theorems 11 and 12 still hold for it. The empirical evaluation shows that this improvement yields a tenfold speedup.

*Final Theorem* A service matrix is a square matrix where the number of rows (resp. columns) corresponds to the number of equivalence classes computed by `groupWIs`. An entry  $m_{i,j}$  in a service matrix should mean that all IP addresses in equivalence class  $i$  are allowed to communicate with all IP addresses in equivalence class  $j$ . This matrix may not be symmetric and it is not the same as the internal representation used in `groupWIs`. So far, Theorem 11 only gives guarantees about the layout of the matrix (i.e., rows and columns), but it does not guarantee that the content of the matrix (i.e., the permissions  $m_{i,j}$ ) has the desired property. In addition, we don't want to present a matrix, but we want to visualize the allowed accesses as graph, for example as shown in e.g., Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10. Since a service matrix is a square matrix, it can be visualized as graph by treating it as an adjacency matrix. In this way, the function `groupWIs` only computes the nodes of the graph.

To draw a graph, for example with TikZ [70] or Graphviz [32, 34], one first needs to print the nodes and print the edges afterwards. The name of the nodes (representatives) should not be printed but the IP range they actually represent (equivalence classes). For example, the source code for Figure 5 may be defined as follows:

```
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (a) at (-4,-4) {$\{131.159.21.0 .. 131.159.21.255\}$};
  \node (b) at (4,-4) {$\{131.159.15.240 .. 131.159.15.255\}$};
  \node (c) at (0,-6) {$\{127.0.0.0 .. 127.255.255.255\}$};
  ...

  \draw (a) to (b);
  \draw (c) to (a);
  \draw (c) to (b);
  \draw (c) to (c);
  ...
\end{tikzpicture}
```

<sup>46</sup> Since we can easily check at runtime whether a ruleset has a default policy, this fallback solely exists for the purpose of stating our theorems without requiring the assumption of a default policy. Our faster algorithm (with default policy) and slower algorithm (without default policy) compute the same result. In practice, any ruleset has a default policy and the faster algorithm is always used.

In this example, the node names **a**, **b**, and **c** are identifiers which semantically correspond to the set of IP addresses described by their label. For example, **a** represents the equivalence class with the range from 131.159.21.0 to 131.159.21.255. The coordinates, for example  $(-4, -4)$  for node **a** are not relevant for our concerns. The edges mean that the complete IP ranges referenced by their representatives may communicate, e.g., `\draw (a) to (b)` means that the complete set 131.159.21.0/24 may establish connections to 131.159.15.240/28. In the final drawing, the identifiers **a**, **b**, and **c** are not shown but only their corresponding IP ranges.

A graph  $(V, E)$  consists of a set of vertices  $V$  and a set of edges  $E \subseteq V \times V$ . In our scenario, we have a map  $\hat{V}$  where the keys are identifiers (**a**, **b**, **c**, ...) which map to their equivalence class (set of IP addresses). We chose  $V$  to be the domain of  $\hat{V}$ . Conveniently, the union of the range of  $\hat{V}$  is the universe. We compute the keys of  $\hat{V}$  by calling `groupWls` and selecting a representative for each equivalence class (e.g., by taking the lowest IP address). We compute  $E$  by calling `simple-fw` for each pair of  $V \times V$ . Note that  $V$  is minimized and the empirical evaluation shows that this quadratic number of calls to `simple-fw` is not a performance problem. For convenience, we printed symbolic identifiers **a**, **b**, **c**, ... for the keys of  $\hat{V}$  instead of IP addresses. We present a final theorem which justifies the correctness of graphs which are drawn according to our method.<sup>47</sup>

**Theorem 12 (Service Matrix)** *Let  $(\hat{V}, E)$  be a service matrix. Then,*

$$\begin{aligned} & (\exists s_{\text{repr}} d_{\text{repr}} s_{\text{range}} d_{\text{range}}. (s_{\text{repr}}, d_{\text{repr}}) \in E \wedge \\ & \quad \hat{V} s_{\text{repr}} = \text{Some } s_{\text{range}} \wedge s \in s_{\text{range}} \wedge \\ & \quad \hat{V} d_{\text{repr}} = \text{Some } d_{\text{range}} \wedge d \in d_{\text{range}}) \\ & \quad \longleftrightarrow \\ & \text{simple-fw } rs \ p(\text{src} \mapsto s, \text{dst} \mapsto d) = \odot \end{aligned}$$

The theorem reads as follows: For a fixed connection, one can look up IP addresses (source  $s$  and destination  $d$  pairs) in the graph if and only if the firewall accepts this  $(s, d)$  IP address pair for the fixed connection.

The part which complicates the formalization is the notion of “looking up IP addresses in the graph”. To look up a source IP address  $s$  in the graph, one first locates  $s$  as a member in one of the IP equivalence classes, here  $s_{\text{range}}$ . This equivalence class is represented by a representative  $s_{\text{repr}}$ . The same is done to obtain  $d_{\text{repr}}$ . The theorem now says that  $(s_{\text{repr}}, d_{\text{repr}}) \in E$  if and only if the firewall allows packets from  $s$  to  $d$ . The if-and-only-if relationship in combination with the existential quantifier also implies that there is always exactly one equivalence class in which we can find  $s$  and  $d$ , which means that our graph always contains a complete and disjoint representation of the IP address space.

### 13 Stand-Alone Haskell Tool *ffuu*

We used Isabelle’s code generation features [35, 36] to build a stand-alone tool in Haskell. Since all analysis and transformation algorithms are written in Isabelle,

<sup>47</sup> Formalization: definition `access_matrix`, theorem `access_matrix`

we only needed to add parsers and user interface. Overall, more than 80% of the code is generated by Isabelle, which gives us strong trust in the tool.

We call our tool *ffuu*, the “fancy formal firewall universal understander”.

*ffuu* requires only one parameter to run, namely, an `iptables-save` dump. This makes it very usable. Optionally, one may pass an *ipassmt*, change the `table` or `chain` which is loaded, pass a routing table for output port rewriting, or select the services for the service matrix.

*ffuu* can be easily compiled from source using `stack` [16], which ensures reproducible builds well into the future.

*Example* We demonstrate *ffuu* by a small example. We want to infer the intention behind the ruleset shown in Figure 4. Though this ruleset was artificially crafted to demonstrate certain corner cases, it is based on actual rules from real-world firewalls [1, 18]. Also note that the interface name `\e[31m\^e[0m` (rendered as `^`) with UTF-8 symbols and shell escapes for color [52] is perfectly valid.

It is hard to guess what the ruleset is implementing. We load the ruleset into *ffuu*, not requiring any additional parameters or manual steps to compute it. The resulting service matrix (for arbitrary ports) is shown in Figure 5 and provides insight into the intention of the ruleset. An arrow from one IP range to another IP range indicates that the first range may set up connections with the second.

At the bottom, we see the localhost range of 127.0.0.0/8. The reflexive arrow (localhost to localhost) shows that the firewall does not block its own localhost traffic, which is usually a good sign. However, localhost traffic is usually not interesting for a firewall analysis since this range is usually not routed [17]. We will ignore it from now.

On the top, in the cloud, we see a large set of IP addresses. This corresponds to the Internet. On the left, we see the 131.159.21.0/24 range. It may access the Internet and the 131.159.15.240/28 range. On the right, we see the 131.159.15.240/28 range, which may only access the Internet, but not the 131.159.21.0/24 range.

Carefully looking at the figure, we might recognize the overall architecture: The firewall simply implements the textbook version of the “Demilitarized Zone” (DMZ) architecture. Starting from the original `iptables-save` input, without the help of *ffuu*, this would have been difficult to uncover and verify.

## 14 Evaluation

We obtained real-world rulesets from over 15 firewalls. Some are central, production-critical devices. They are written by different authors, utilize a vast amount of different features and exhibit different styles and patterns. The fact that we publish the complete rulesets is an important contribution (cf. Wool [75, 77]). To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest, publicly available collection of real-world iptables rulesets. Note: some administrators wish to remain anonymous so we replaced their public IP addresses with public IP ranges of our institute, preserving all IP subset relationships.

Table 1 summarizes the evaluation’s results. The first column (“Fw”) labels the analyzed ruleset. Column 2 (“Rules”) contains the number of rules (only the filter table) in the output of `iptables-save`. We work directly on these real-world data sets. Column 3 describes the analyzed chain. Depending on the type of firewall, we

```

*filter
:INPUT DROP [0:0]
:FORWARD DROP [0:0]
:OUTPUT DROP [0:0]
:DOS_PROTECT - [0:0]
:GOOD~STUFF - [0:0]
-A FORWARD -j DOS_PROTECT
-A FORWARD -j GOOD~STUFF
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m multiport ! --dports 80,443,6667,6697 -m hashlimit      ←
    --hashlimit-above 10/sec --hashlimit-burst 20 --hashlimit-mode srcip    ←
    --hashlimit-name aflood --hashlimit-srcmask 8 -j LOG
-A FORWARD ! -i lo -s 127.0.0.0/8 -j DROP
-A FORWARD -i internal -s 131.159.21.0/24 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -s 131.159.15.240/28 -d 131.159.21.0/24 -j DROP
-A FORWARD -p tcp -d 131.159.15.240/28 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -i 🚫 -p tcp -s 131.159.15.240/28 -j ACCEPT
-A GOOD~STUFF -i lo -j ACCEPT
-A GOOD~STUFF -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A GOOD~STUFF -p icmp -m state --state RELATED -j ACCEPT
-A DOS_PROTECT -i eth1 -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type 8 ... --limit 1/sec -j RETURN
-A DOS_PROTECT -i eth1 -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type 8 -j DROP
COMMIT

```

Fig. 4 Example ruleset




Fig. 5 Service matrix of ruleset in Figure 4

either analyzed the `FORWARD` (“FW”) or the `INPUT` (“IN”) chain. For a host firewall, we analyzed IN; for a network firewall, e.g., on a gateway or router, we analyzed FW. In parentheses, we wrote the number of rules after unfolding the analyzed chain. The unfolding also features some generic, straight-forward optimizations, such as removing rules where the match expression is `False`. Column 4 (“Simple rules”) is the number of rules when translated to the simple firewall. In parentheses, we wrote the number of simple firewall rules when interfaces are removed. This ruleset is used subsequently to compute the partitions and service matrices. In column 5 (“Use”), we mark whether the translated simple firewall is useful. We will detail on the metric later. Column 6 (“Parts”) lists the number of IP address space partitions. For comparison, we give the number of partitions computed by ITVal in parentheses. In Columns 7 and 8, we give the number of partitions for the service matrices for SSH and HTTP. In column 9 (“Time (ITVal)”), for comparison, we put the runtime of the partitioning by ITVal in parentheses in seconds, minutes, or hours. In column 10 (“Time (this)”), we give the overall runtime of our analysis.

When translating to the simple firewall, to accomplish support for arbitrary matching primitives, some approximations need to be performed. For every firewall, the first row states the overapproximation (more permissive), the second row the underapproximation (more strict).

In contrast to the intermediate evaluation, there is no longer the need to manually exclude certain rules from the analysis (cf. Section 6.4). For some rulesets, we do not know the interface configuration. For others, there were zone-spanning interfaces. For these reasons, as proven in Section 11.6, in the majority of cases, we could not rewrite interfaces. This is one reason for the differences between over- and underapproximation.

We loaded all translated simple firewall rulesets (without interfaces) with `iptables-restore`. This validates that our results are well-formed. We then used `iptables` directly to generate the firewall format required by ITVal (`iptables -L -n`). Our translation to the simple firewall is required because ITVal cannot understand the original complex rulesets and produces flawed results for them.

*Performance* We have two possibilities to execute our algorithms, depending on whether the user wants to run them inside of Isabelle or as an external stand-alone application [35].

For our evaluation, we utilize Isabelle’s code reflection capabilities. In essence, it gives us a way to execute our algorithms as if they were implemented in Isabelle’s implementation language (Standard ML). Isabelle’s code generator introduces its own unoptimized version for data structures that are already present in the standard libraries of many programming languages. Hence, the generated code may be quite inefficient.<sup>48</sup> For example, lookups in Isabelle-generated dictionaries have linear lookup time, compared to constant lookup time of standard library implementations. In contrast, ITVal is highly optimized C++ code. We benchmarked our tool on a commodity i7-2620M laptop with 2 physical cores and 8 GB of RAM. In contrast, we executed ITVal on a server with 16 physical Xeon E5-2650 cores and 128 GB RAM. The runtime measured for our tool is the complete transla-

<sup>48</sup> There are methods to improve the performance and provably preserve correctness [43,44], which are out of the scope of this article.

Fw	Rules	Chain (unfolded)	Simple rules (no ifaces)	Use	Parts (ITVal)	SSH	HTTP	Time (ITVal)	Time (this)
A	2784	FW (2376)	2381 (1920)	✓	246 (1)	13	9	3 h*	172 s
	-	FW (2376)	2837 (581)	✗ <sup>r</sup>	522 (1)	1	1	9 h*	194 s
A	4113	FW (2922)	3114 (2862)	✓	334 (2)	11	11	27 h*	302 s
	-	FW (2922)	3585 (517)	✗ <sup>r</sup>	490 (1)	1	1	8 h	320 s
A	4814	FW (4403)	3574 (3144)	✓	364 (2)	9	12	46 h*	477 s
	-	FW (4403)	5123 (1601)	✗ <sup>r</sup>	1574 (1)	1	1	3 h*	618 s
A	4946	FW (4887)	4004 (3570)	✓	371 (2)	9	12	53 h*	578 s
	-	FW (4887)	5563 (1613)	✗ <sup>r</sup>	1585 (1)	1	1	4 h*	820 s
B	88	FW (40)	110 (106)	✓	50 (4)	4	2	2 s	3 s
	-	FW (40)	183 (75)	✓	40 (1)	1	1	1 s	2 s
C	53	FW (30)	29 (12)	✓	8 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
	-	FW (30)	27 (1)	✓	1 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
	-	IN (49)	74 (46)	✓	38 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
	-	IN (49)	75 (21)	✓	6 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
D	373	FW (2649)	3482 (166)	✓	43 (1)	1	1	3 s	22 s
	-	FW (2649)	16592 (1918)	✗	67 (1)	1	1	33 min*	49 s
E	31	IN (24)	57 (27)	✓	4 (3)	1	2	1 s	10 s
	-	IN (24)	61 (45)	✗ <sup>r</sup>	3 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
F	263	IN (261)	263 (263)	✓	250 (3)	3	3	2 min	80 s
	-	IN (261)	265 (264)	✓	250 (3)	3	3	3 min	57 s
G	68	IN (28)	20 (20)	✓	8 (5)	1	2	1 s	8 s
	-	IN (28)	19 (19)	✗	8 (2)	2	2	1 s	1 s
H	19	FW (20)	10 (10)	✗	9 (1)	1	1	1 s	8 s
	-	FW (20)	8 (8)	✗ <sup>r</sup>	3 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
I	15	FW (5)	4 (4)	✓	4 (4)	4	4	1 s	8 s
	-	FW (5)	4 (4)	✓	4 (4)	4	4	1 s	1 s
J	48	FW (12)	5 (5)	✓	3 (2)	2	2	1 s	6 s
	-	FW (12)	8 (2)	✓	1 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
K	21	FW (9)	7 (6)	✓	3 (1)	1	1	1 s	12 s
	-	FW (9)	4 (3)	✓	2 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
L	27	IN (16)	19 (19)	✓	17 (3)	2	2	1 s	1 s
	-	IN (16)	18 (18)	✓	17 (3)	2	2	1 s	1 s
M	80	IN (92)	64 (16)	✓	2 (2)	1	2	1 s	6 s
	-	IN (92)	58 (27)	✗	11 (1)	1	1	1 s	1 s
N	34	FW (14)	12 (12)	✓	10 (6)	6	6	2 s	2 s
	-	FW (14)	12 (12)	✓	10 (6)	6	6	2 s	1 s
O	8	IN (7)	9 (9)	✓	3 (3)	1	2	1 s	1 s
	-	IN (7)	8 (8)	✓	3 (3)	1	2	1 s	1 s
P	595	IN (15)	8 (8)	✓	3 (2)	2	2	1 s	6 s
	-	IN (15)	9 (9)	✓	3 (2)	2	2	1 s	6 s
	595	FW (66)	64 (64)	✓	60 (5)	5	4	22 s	6 s
-	FW (66)	63 (63)	✓	60 (5)	5	4	22 s	7 s	
Q	58	IN (59)	65 (65)	✓	21 (1)	1	1	2 s	2 s
	-	IN (59)	62 (62)	✓	21 (2)	2	1	2 s	1 s
R	30	FW (28)	123 (123)	✓	14 (1)	1	6	1 s	1 s
	-	FW (28)	20 (3)	✓	2 (2)	2	1	1 s	1 s

\* ITVal memory consumption, in order of appearance:  
84 GB, 96 GB, 94 GB, 95 GB, 61 GB, 98 GB, 96 GB, 21 GB

**Table 1** Summary of evaluation on real-world firewalls

tion to the two simple firewalls, computation of partitions, and the two service matrices. In contrast, the ITVal runtime only consists of computing one partition.

These benchmark settings are biased against our tool. Indeed, exporting our tool to a standalone Haskell application instead, replacing some common data structures with optimized ones from the Haskell standard library, enabling aggressive compiler optimization and parallelization, and running our tool on the Xeon server, the runtime of our tool improves by orders of magnitude. Our stand-alone tool *ffuu* also achieves a better runtime by orders of magnitude. Nevertheless, we chose the “unfair” setting to demonstrate the feasibility of running verified code directly in a theorem prover.

Table 1 shows that our tool outperforms ITVal for large firewalls. We added ITVal’s memory requirements to the table if they exceeded 20 GB. ITVal requires an infeasible amount of memory for larger rulesets while our tool can finish on commodity hardware. The overall numbers show that the runtime for our tool is sufficient for static, offline analysis, even for large real-world rulesets.

For our daily use and convenience, we use our Haskell tool *ffuu* which adds another order of magnitude of speedup to our numbers of Table 1.


*Quality of results* The main goal of ITVal is to compute a minimal partition while ours may not be minimal. Since a service matrix is more specific than a partition, a partition cannot be smaller than a service matrix. ITVal may produce spurious results (and it did in certain examples) while ours are provably correct. For firewalls *A* and *R*, it can be seen that ITVal’s results must be spurious: If the number of partitions calculated by ITVal is smaller than those of a service matrix, this is an error in ITVal. However, comparing the number of partitions for other rulesets, we can see that ITVal often computes better results. Our service matrices are provably minimal and can improve on ITVal’s partitioning.

In Column 5, we show the usefulness of the translated simple firewall (including interfaces). We deem a firewall useful if interesting information was preserved by the approximation. Therefore, we manually inspected the ruleset and compared it to the original. For the overapproximation, we focused on preserved (non-shadowed) `Drop` rules. For the underapproximation, we focused on preserved (non-shadowed) `Accept` rules. If the firewall features some rate-limiting for all packets in the beginning, the underapproximation is naturally a drop-all ruleset because the rate-limiting could apply to all packets. According to our metric, such a ruleset is of no use (but the only sound solution). We indicate this case with a superscript <sup>r</sup>. The table indicates that, usually, at least one approximation per firewall is useful.

For brevity, we only elaborate on the most interesting rulesets and consequences of their analysis.

*Firewall A* This firewall is the core firewall of our lab (Chair of Network Architectures and Services). It has two uplinks, interconnects several VLANs, and matches on more than 20 interfaces. It has around 500 direct users and one transfer network for an autonomous system (AS) behind it. The traffic is usually several Mbit/s. We have analyzed dumps from Oct 2013, Sep 2014, May 2015, and Sep 2015. The changing number of rules indicates that it is actively managed.

The firewall starts with some rate-limiting rules. Therefore, its stricter approximation assumes that the rate-limiting always applies and transforms the ruleset



**Fig. 6** Lab SSH Service Matrix (2015)

into a deny-all ruleset. The more permissive approximation abstracts over this rate-limiting and provides a very good approximation of the original ruleset.

The SSH service matrix is visualized in Figure 6 and in Figure 7 with the raw IP addresses. The figure can be read as follows: The vast majority of our IP addresses are grouped into *internal* and *servers*. Servers are reachable from the outside, internal hosts are not.  $ip_1$  and  $ip_2$  are two individual IP addresses with special exceptions. There is also a group for the backbone routers of the connected AS. INET is the set of IP addresses which does not belong to us, basically the Internet. INET' is another part of the Internet. With the help of the service matrix, the administrator confirmed that the existence of INET' was an error caused by a stale rule. The misconfiguration has been fixed. Figure 6 summarizes over 4000 firewall rules and helps to easily visually verify the complex SSH setup of our firewall. The administrator was also interested in the Kerberos (kerberos-adm) and LDAP service matrices. They helped verifying the complex setup and discovered potential for ruleset cleanup.

We have used the *ffuu* tool further on to analyze our firewall. For example, Figure 8 (IPv4) and Figure 9 (IPv6) were created from a recent snapshot of June 2016 and depict the service matrix for HTTP. This snapshot is not listed in the table. The figures show the raw IP addresses. It can be seen that the “two INETs” bug has been fixed, but the overall complexity of the firewall increased. Note that the service matrix is minimal, i.e., there is no way to compress it any further. The two figures reveal the intrinsic complexity of this firewall. However, the figures, though complicated, can still be visualized on one page. This would be impossible for the thousands of rules of the actual ruleset. It demonstrates that our service matrices can give a suitable overview of complicated rulesets.

*Firewall D* This firewall was taken from a Shorewall system with 373 rules and 65 chains. It can be seen that unfolding increases the number of rules, because of the complex call structures generated by the user-defined chains. Transforming to the simple firewall further increases the ruleset size. This is, among other reasons, due to rewriting several negated IP matches back to non-negated CIDR ranges and NNF normalization. However, the absolute numbers tell us that this blow up is no problem for computerized analysis.




Fig. 7 Lab SSH Service Matrix with raw IP addresses (2015)

Roughly speaking, the firewall connects interfaces to each other, i.e., it heavily uses `-i` and `-o`. This can be easily seen in the overapproximation. There are also many zone-spanning interfaces. As we have proven, it is impossible to rewrite interfaces in this case. In addition, for some interfaces, no IP ranges are specified. Hence, this ruleset is more of a link layer firewall than a network layer firewall. Consequently, the service matrices are barely of any use.

Later on, having obtained more detailed interface and routing configurations, we tried again with input and output port rewriting. The result is not shown in the table, but visualized in Figure 10. The figure now correctly summarizes the network architecture enforced by the firewall. It shows the general Internet, a Debian update server (141.76.2.4), and four internal networks with different access rights.

*Firewall E* This ruleset was taken from a NAS device from the introduction (Figure 1). The ruleset first performs some rate-limiting. Consequently, the underapproximation corresponds to the deny-all ruleset. The table lists a more recent




Fig. 8 Lab IPv4 HTTP Service Matrix (2016)

version of the ruleset after a system update. Our SSH service matrix reveals a misconfiguration: SSH was accidentally left enabled after the update. After this discovery, the flaw was fixed. The service matrix for the other services provided by the NAS (not listed in the table) verifies that these services are only accessible from the local network. This finally yields the expected result as motivated in the introduction.

*Firewall F* This firewall is running on a publicly accessible server. The firewall first allows everything for localhost, then blocks IP addresses which have shown malicious behavior in the past, and finally allows certain services. Since most rules are devoted to blocking malicious IPs, our IP address space partition roughly grows linearly with the number of rules. The service matrices, however, reveal that there are actually only three classes of IP ranges: localhost, the blocked IPs, and all other IPs which are granted access to the services.





Fig. 9 Lab IPv6 HTTP Service Matrix (2016)

*Firewall G* For this production server, the service matrices verified that a SQL daemon is only accessible from a local network and three explicitly-defined public IP addresses. Our tool could verify the belief of the administrator that the firewall is configured correctly.

*Firewall H* This ruleset from 2003 appears to block Kazaa filesharing traffic during working hours. In addition, a rule drops all packets with the string “X-Kazaa-User”. The more permissive abstraction correctly tells that the firewall may accept all packets for all IPs (if the above conditions do not hold). Hence, the firewall is essentially abstracted to an allow-all ruleset. According to our metric, this information is not useful. However, in this scenario, this information may reveal an error in the ruleset: The firewall explicitly permits certain IP ranges, but the default policy is **Accept** and includes all these previously explicitly permitted ranges. By inspecting the structure of the firewall, we suspect that the default policy should be **Drop**. This possible misconfiguration was uncovered by the overapproximation.

The underapproximation does not understand the string match on “X-Kazaa-User” in the beginning and thus corresponds to the deny-all ruleset. However, a manual inspection of the underapproximation still reveals an interesting error: The ruleset also tries to prevent MAC address spoofing for some hard-coded MAC/IP




**Fig. 10** Firewall D SSH service matrix with input and output port rewriting

pairs. However, we could not see any drop rules for spoofed MAC addresses in the underapproximation. Indeed, the ruleset allows non-spoofed packets but forgets to drop the spoofed ones. This firewall demonstrates the worst case for our approximations: one set of accepted packets is the universe, the other is the empty set. But because this ruleset is severely broken, no better approximation would be possible. Nevertheless, the manual inspection of the simplified ruleset helped reveal several errors. This demonstrates that even if the service matrices do not contain any information, the other output of our tool may still contain interesting information.

*Firewall P* This is the ruleset of the main firewall of a medium-sized company. The administrator asked us what their ruleset was doing. They did not reveal their intentions to prevent analysis results skewed towards the expected outcome.

We calculated the simplified firewall rules and service matrices. Using the underapproximation, we could also give guarantees about the packets which are definitely allowed by the firewall. The administrator critically inspected the output of our tool. Finally, they confirmed that the firewall was working exactly as intended. This demonstrates: Not only finding errors but showing correctness is one of the key strengths of our tool.

After the analysis, the administrator revealed their true intentions. They have previously upgraded the system to iptables. Their users (the company's employees) became aware of that. They received some complaints about connectivity issues and the employees were blaming the firewall. However, the administrator



**Fig. 11** HTTP service matrix with state of a Docker host

was suspecting that the connectivity issues were triggered by some users who are behaving against the corporate policy, e.g., sharing user accounts. With the help of our analysis, the administrator could reject all accusations about their firewall configuration and follow their initial suspicion about misbehaving employees.

A few months later, we received feedback that the firewall was perfect and “users are stupid”.

*Firewall R* This ruleset was extracted from a Docker host and partly generated by *topoS* [22]. For remote management, the ruleset allows unconstrained SSH access for all machines, which can be seen by the fact that the SSH service matrix only shows one partition. In contrast, an advanced setup is enforced for HTTP and the HTTP matrix is visualized in Figure 11. Being able to verify the publicly exposed HTTP setup while neglecting the SSH maintenance setup demonstrates the advantage of calculating our access matrices for each service. We extended *ffwu* to also show flows which can be in an **ESTABLISHED** state. This is visualized by an orange dashed line. Due to special, scenario-specific requirements, we can see that 10.0.0.2 is a true information sink and may not even answer to **ESTABLISHED** connections. The lower closure also exhibits one interesting detail: Except for one host which is rate limited, SSH connectivity is guaranteed. Ironically, ITVal seg-

faults on the original ruleset. With our processing, it terminates successfully but returns a spurious result.

## 15 Outlook: Verifying OpenFlow Rules

OpenFlow [59, 61] is a standard for configuring OpenFlow-enabled switches. It is usually referred to in the context of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and has been hot topic in network management and operations for almost ten years.

This article focused on the analysis of iptables instead of OpenFlow for several reasons: Despite OpenFlow 1.0 [61] having been available for over five years, it is a relatively young and not very wide-spread product. In contrast, iptables is battle-tested, real-world approved, supports a large amount of features, and has been in productive use for over a decade. There are also decade-old configurations which utilize a vast amount of features, which are no longer fully understood by administrators [1]. As of July 2016, the popular systems and networking Q&A site *Server Fault*<sup>49</sup> counts more than a hundred times more questions related to iptables than OpenFlow. The related *Super User*<sup>50</sup> site counts even a thousand times more questions related to iptables than OpenFlow.

Over the years, iptables has evolved into a system with an enormous amount of (legacy) features. Compared to this, OpenFlow is a tidy piece of technology. But we anticipate to see similar feature creep over the years, considering, e.g., Nicira extensions [57] or attempts to enhance OpenFlow with generic FPGAs to add “exotic functionality” [14]. In a broader context, by extending OpenFlow or one of its proposed stateful, more feature-rich, successors [9], many iptables features have already been reimplemented on top of it [60].

Our declared goal was to provide scientific methods to understand challenging configurations (as observed in iptables) and evaluate our methodology on complex, real-world, legacy-grown systems. The insights we obtained can also be applied to OpenFlow. In particular, a large portion of this article focuses on match conditions, e.g., abstracting over unknowns, optimizing, rewriting, normalizing, or even replacing interfaces by IP addresses. Our work on match conditions can be directly reused in future work within the context of OpenFlow.

However, iptables is not OpenFlow. In particular, the OpenFlow standard defines a vast amount of actions which can be performed for a packet. In contrast, iptables filtering primarily uses the two actions `Accept` and `Drop`. This is because a firewall cleanly separates filtering from other network functions, such as packet rewriting. OpenFlow implementations tend to mix those. We have shown how to deal with unknown match conditions but unknown actions are an unsolved problem. We discussed what would be required for a full OpenFlow semantics. In particular, a mutable packet model (cf. Section 4.2) would be necessary, which our methods do not support. However, there is no technical need for OpenFlow switches to mix packet filtering with other operations. For example, the pipelined OpenFlow Router architecture constructed by Nelson et al. [54, Sec. 3, Fig. 3] clearly separates packet filtering from packet forwarding and rewriting. In general, using pipeline processing as specified in recent OpenFlow standards [59] might be

<sup>49</sup> <https://serverfault.com/>

<sup>50</sup> <https://superuser.com/>

a step forward to separate filtering from forwarding and rewriting. This may also help compilers which produce OpenFlow rules and suffer from a large blow-up which is induced by a cross product over several tables to join rules for different actions into one table [69]. Such a filtering table implemented by OpenFlow rules without unspecified behavior could be analyzed by our presented methods.

## 16 Conclusion

This work was motivated by the fact that we could not find any tool which helped us analyze our lab’s and other firewall rulesets. Though much related work about firewall analysis exists, all academic firewall models are too simplistic to be applicable to those real-world rulesets. With the transformations presented in this article, they became processable by existing tools.

We have demonstrated the first fully verified, real-world applicable analysis framework for firewall rulesets. Our tool *ffvu* supports the Linux iptables firewall because it is widely used and well-known for its vast amount of features. It directly works on `iptables-save` output. We presented an algebra on common match conditions and a method to translate complex conditions to simpler ones. Further match conditions, which are either unknown or cannot be translated, are approximated in a sound fashion. This results in a translation method for complex, real-world rulesets to a simple model. The evaluation demonstrates that, despite possible approximation, the simplified rulesets preserve the interesting aspects of the original ones.

Based on the simplified model, we presented algorithms to partition the IPv4 and IPv6 address space and compute service matrices. This allows summarizing and verifying the firewall in a clear manner.

The analysis is fully implemented in the Isabelle theorem prover. No additional input or knowledge of mathematics is required by the administrator.

The evaluation demonstrates applicability on many real-world rulesets. For this, to the best of our knowledge, we have collected and published the largest collection of real-world iptables rulesets in academia. We demonstrated that our approach can outperform existing tools with regard to correctness, supported match conditions, CPU time, and memory requirements. Our tool helped to verify lack of errors or, alternatively, to discover previously unknown errors in real-world, production rulesets.

## 17 Availability

Our Isabelle/HOL theory files with the formalization and the referenced correctness proofs and our tool *ffvu* are available at

[https://github.com/diekmann/Iptables\\_Semantics](https://github.com/diekmann/Iptables_Semantics)

It is the first fully machine-verified iptables analysis tool. A stable version of the theory files can also be obtained from the “Archive of Formal Proofs” (AFP) [20,23,25,51]. AFP maintenance policy ensures that our formalization will keep working with newer Isabelle releases.

The raw data of the analyzed firewall rulesets can be found at

<https://github.com/diekmann/net-network>

To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest, publicly-available collection of real-world iptables firewall rulesets.

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## Appendix

We provide an alternative formulation of the iptables semantics given in Figure 2. The difference is that this one is slightly less flexible: it always assumes an initial state of  $\textcircled{?}$  (undecided). Additionally, the SEQ and DECISION rules have been merged into all other rules and the CALL-RETURN rule has been split into RETURN and CALLNORESULT. Both semantics are equivalent to each other.<sup>51</sup> We hope that this alternative semantics can provide additional confidence in the correctness of our semantics.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\text{ACCEPT} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Accept}) :: rs \Rightarrow \textcircled{\checkmark}} \qquad \text{RETURN} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Return}) :: rs \Rightarrow \textcircled{?}} \\
\text{DROP} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Drop}) :: rs \Rightarrow \textcircled{\times}} \qquad \text{REJECT} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Reject}) :: rs \Rightarrow \textcircled{\times}} \\
\text{NOMATCH} \quad \frac{\neg \text{match } \gamma \ m \ p \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash rs \Rightarrow s}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, a) :: rs \Rightarrow s} \qquad \text{SKIP} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash [] \Rightarrow \textcircled{?}} \\
\text{CALLRESULT} \quad \frac{\text{match } \gamma \ m \ p \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \Gamma \ c \Rightarrow s \quad s \in \{\textcircled{\checkmark}, \textcircled{\times}\}}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Call } c) :: rs \Rightarrow s} \\
\text{CALLNORESULT} \quad \frac{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \Gamma \ c \Rightarrow \textcircled{?} \quad \Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash rs \Rightarrow s}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Call } c) :: rs \Rightarrow s} \\
\text{LOG} \quad \frac{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash rs \Rightarrow s}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Log}) :: rs \Rightarrow s} \qquad \text{EMPTY} \quad \frac{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash rs \Rightarrow s}{\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash (m, \text{Empty}) :: rs \Rightarrow s}
\end{array}$$

(for any primitive matcher  $\gamma$  and any well-formed ruleset  $\Gamma$ )

**Fig. 12** Alternative big-step semantics for iptables

**Theorem 13 (Equivalence)** *If no call to  $c$  occurs in any of the chains of  $\Gamma$  and default-policy is either Accept or Drop, then*

$$\begin{array}{c}
\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash [(m, \text{Call } c), (\text{True}, \text{default-policy})] \Rightarrow s \\
\longleftrightarrow \\
\Gamma, \gamma, p \vdash \langle [(m, \text{Call } c), (\text{True}, \text{default-policy})], \textcircled{?} \rangle \Rightarrow s
\end{array}$$

Note that for finite rulesets (i.e. the image/range of  $\Gamma$  is finite), we can always find a  $c$  such that no call occurs to it. In practice,  $c$  is always INPUT, FORWARD, or OUTPUT, and the Linux kernel rejects rulesets where a user calls these chains directly.

<sup>51</sup> Formalization: theorem `iptables_bigstep_r.eq`