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The tutorials on 02.07 and 09.07 have to be moved. Please participate in the poll on Zulip until 28.06 to find a new date for the tutorials.

## Exercise 11.1. [Decidability of Complete Theories]

Assume $S$ is finitely axiomatizable and complete, i.e. $F \in S$ or $\neg F \in S$ for any sentence $F$.

1. Given only the axiomatization of $S$, give a procedure deciding whether $S \models F$ for any sentence $F$.
2. Can you obtain a similar result when the assumption is that the axiom system is only recursively enumerable?

## Solution:

1. Let $M$ be the set of axioms. Run resolution on $M \wedge F$ and $M \wedge \neg F$ in parallel. If $F \notin S$, then $M \wedge F \vdash \square$ and the first resolution terminates. If $F \in S$, then $M \wedge \neg F \vdash \square$ and the second resolution terminates.
2. Yes, by compactness. Enumerate all finite subsets of the axiom set and execute the resolution calls in a dovetailing approach.

## Exercise 11.2. [Consequence]

Show that $C n$ is a closure operator, i.e. $C n$ fulfills the following properties:

- $S \subseteq C n(S)$
- if $S \subseteq S^{\prime}$ then $C n(S) \subseteq C n\left(S^{\prime}\right)$
- $C n(C n(S))=C n(S)$


## Solution:

In the following, suppose $S, S^{\prime}$ are sets of $\Sigma$-sentences and $F$ is a $\Sigma$-sentence.

- $F \in S \Longrightarrow S \models F \Longrightarrow F \in C n(S)$
- $F \in C n(S) \Longrightarrow S \vDash F \Longrightarrow S^{\prime} \models F \Longrightarrow F \in C n\left(S^{\prime}\right)$
- From the first property, we get $C n(S) \subseteq C n(C n(S))$. For the other direction, we have $F \in C n(C n(S)) \Longrightarrow C n(S) \models F \Longrightarrow{ }^{(*)} S \models F \Longrightarrow F \in C n(S)$.
We have (*) because $\mathcal{A} \models C n(S)$ iff $\mathcal{A} \models S$ by definition of $C n$.


## Exercise 11.3. [One Finite, All Finite]

Show that if a theory is finitely axiomatizable, any countable axiomatization of it has a finite subset that axiomatizes the same theory. In other words, if $C n(\Gamma)=C n(\Delta)$ with $\Gamma$ countable and $\Delta$ finite, then there is a finite $\Gamma^{\prime} \subseteq \Gamma$ with $C n\left(\Gamma^{\prime}\right)=C n(\Gamma)$. Can you also obtain $\Gamma^{\prime}$ effectively?

## Solution:

Let us identify $\Delta$ as the formula $\bigwedge_{F \in \Delta} F$. It suffices to find a finite subset $\Gamma^{\prime} \subseteq \Gamma$ that axiomatizes $C n(\Delta)$. For this, it is sufficient to find $\Gamma^{\prime} \subseteq \Gamma$ such that $\Gamma^{\prime} \models \Delta$, which is equivalent to $\Gamma^{\prime} \cup\{\neg \Delta\}$ being unsatisfiable.
We know that $\Gamma \cup\{\neg \Delta\}$ is unsatisfiable because $\Gamma$ axiomatizes $C n(\Delta)$. By compactness, there must be a finite subset that is unsatisfiable. We can find this subset by enumerating all finite subsets $\Gamma^{\prime} \subseteq \Gamma$ and running resolution on $\Gamma^{\prime}, \neg \Delta$.

## Exercise 11.4. [Natural Deduction]

Prove the following formula using natural deduction.

$$
\neg(\forall x(\exists y(\neg P(x) \wedge P(y))))
$$

## Solution:

Homework 11.1. [Counterexamples from Sequent Calculus] (++)
Consider the statement $\forall x(P(x) \rightarrow \neg P(f(x)))$.

1. What happens when trying to prove the validity of this formula in sequent calculus?
2. How can we derive a countermodel from the proof tree?
3. Is there a smaller countermodel?

## Solution:

The proof tree gets stuck:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{P(y), P(f(y)) \Rightarrow}{P(y) \Rightarrow \neg P(f(y))} \neg R \\
\Rightarrow & \Rightarrow P(y) \rightarrow \neg P(f(y))
\end{aligned} R
$$

As in the lecture, we can create a countermodel $\mathcal{A}$ : Let $U_{\mathcal{A}}$ be the set of all terms over $y, f(\cdot)$, set $y^{\mathcal{A}}:=y, f^{\mathcal{A}}(t):=f\left(t^{\mathcal{A}}\right)$, and $P^{\mathcal{A}}:=\{y, f(y)\}$. Then $\mathcal{A} \models P(y)$ and $\mathcal{A} \models P(f(y))$ and hence $\mathcal{A} \not \vDash \forall x(P(x) \rightarrow \neg P(f(x)))$. Note that $\mathcal{A}$ is infinite, but there are countermodels with just two elements $\{a, b\}$ : Set $f(a):=b, f(b):=b, P(a)$ and $P(b)$. Then $P(a)$ and $P(f(a))=P(b)$.
Homework 11.2. [Natural Deduction]
Prove the following statements using natural deduction.

1. $\neg \forall x \exists y \forall z(\neg P(x, z) \wedge P(z, y))$
2. $\exists x(P(x) \rightarrow \forall x P(x))$

## Solution:

You can ask for hints on Zulip.

Homework 11.3. [Elementary Classes]
In this exercise, we assume that all structures and formulas share the same signature $\Sigma$.
We define the operator $\operatorname{Mod}(S)$ that returns the class of all structures that model a set of formulas $S$. In other words, $\operatorname{Mod}(S)$ contains all $\mathcal{A}$ such that $\mathcal{A} \models S$.
A class of models $M$ is said to be elementary if there is a set of formulas $S$ such that $M=\operatorname{Mod}(S)$. If $S$ is just a singleton set, i.e. there is a formula $F$ such that $S=\{F\}$, then $M$ is basic elementary.
Prove:

1. A class of models $M$ is basic elementary if and only if there is a finite set of formulas $S$ such that $M=\operatorname{Mod}(S)$.
2. If $M$ is basic elementary and $M=\operatorname{Mod}(S)$ for countable $S$, then there is a finite subset $S^{\prime} \subseteq S$ such that $M=\operatorname{Mod}\left(S^{\prime}\right)$.

## Solution:

For the first task, simply take $F:=\bigwedge_{G \in S} G$.
For the second task, it suffices to show that $\operatorname{Mod}(S)=\operatorname{Mod}\left(S^{\prime}\right) \Longleftrightarrow C n(S)=C n\left(S^{\prime}\right)$. The result then follows from tutorial exercise 11.3. Here's the direction from left to right:

$$
\begin{aligned}
F \in C n(S) & \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \models F \text { for any model } \mathcal{M} \text { of } S \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \vDash F \text { for any } \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}(S) \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \vDash F \text { for any } \mathcal{M} \in \operatorname{Mod}\left(S^{\prime}\right) \\
& \Longleftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \vDash F \text { for any model } \mathcal{M} \text { of } S^{\prime} \\
& \Longleftrightarrow F \in C n\left(S^{\prime}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

The other direction is similar.

The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood.

- Ludwig Wittgenstein ${ }^{1}$
${ }^{1}$ Yes, Ludwig strikes again - he just dropped too many great quotes.

